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Article

Executive Compensation in the Courts:
Board Capture, Optimal Contracting, and
Officers’ Fiduciary Duties
Randall S. Thomas† and Harwell Wells††
For all of the howls of protest and handwringing about executive compensation in the United States over the past thirty
years, it is remarkable how little has been done to clamp down
on allegedly excessive pay.1 Given the tremendous public pressure for change, one would think that policy reforms would
have resolved these issues by now. Yet, to date, compensation
activists have not persuaded Congress, state legislators, the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), or the courts to
engage in major reforms.2 Reforms that have been tried, such
† J.D., Ph.D., John S. Beasley II Professor of Law and Business, Vanderbilt Law School; Professor of Management, Owen School of Business, Vanderbilt University.
†† J.D., Ph.D., Associate Professor of Law, James E. Beasley School of
Law, Temple University. The authors thank Justice Randy Holland, Chancellor William Chandler, Vice Chancellor John Noble, Vice Chancellor Leo Strine,
Larry Cunningham, Jill Fisch, Nancy Knauer, Donald Langevoort, Jonathan
Lipson, Salil Mehra, David Millon, Larry Ribstein, Amanda Rose, and Robert
Thompson for helpful comments; audiences at Queen Mary’s School of Law,
University of London; the 12th Annual Law and Business Conference at Vanderbilt Law School and the College of Law of the University of Illinois; and especially David Barnes, for both exemplary research assistance and insightful
comments. Harwell Wells also thanks Temple University’s James A. Beasley
School of Law for a leave during which parts of this Article were drafted. Copyright © 2011 by Randall S. Thomas and Harwell Wells.
1. See, e.g., Gretchen Morgenson, Imperfect Politics of Pay, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 9, 2009, at BU1, available at 2009 WLNR 15396024; Floyd Norris, A
Window Opens on Pay for Bosses, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15, 2010, at B1, available
at 2010 WLNR 880749; Colin Barr, Obama Talks Tough on CEO Pay,
FORTUNE, Feb. 4, 2009, http://money.cnn.com/2009/02/04/news/obama.exec.pay
.fortune/index.htm. In the last two years, longstanding concern over executive
pay has been exacerbated by bonuses paid at firms receiving aid through the
Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP).
2. In the past year, the federal government has intervened to limit compensation at firms that received funds from the TARP program; however, this
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as requirements that most executive compensation be incentive-based3 or nonbinding say-on-pay shareholder votes,4 have
done little to slow the growth of executive pay.5
While the public apparently believes that change is needed,
not all theorists agree; indeed, a lack of consensus among
theorists that a new system is needed may be a significant barrier to change. Advocates of one school of thought, Optimal
Contracting, argue that there has been little action because
there is no real problem.6 They believe that most boards are
negotiating the best possible CEO compensation arrangements
(including employment contracts) in order to maximize shareholder value given the underlying contracting costs, such as the
current corporate governance system in the United States.7 Optimal Contracting theorists contend that the existing executive
compensation system is largely working fine and that little
change is needed to ensure that shareholders are getting their
money’s worth.8
In light of the recent deluge of academic and popular criticism of executive pay as well as recent legislation in this area,
the belief that the American executive compensation system

intervention has been limited to a relatively small number of firms, and several firms have moved to pay back the funds so they will no longer be under the
federal limits. See TARP Standards for Compensation and Corporate Governance, 31 C.F.R. § 30 (2009); David Enrich & Deborah Solomon, Citi, Wells to
Repay Bailout, WALL ST. J., Dec. 15, 2009, at A1.
3. See, e.g., Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 10366, 107 Stat. 312 (1993). Since 1994, corporations have been forbidden to deduct compensation in excess of $1 million paid to their top five officers unless
this compensation is performance-based. JAMES D. COX & THOMAS LEE
HAZEN, CORPORATIONS § 11.06, at 235 (2d ed. 2003).
4. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L.
No. 111-203, § 951, 124 Stat. 1376, 1899–900 (2010) (to be codified at 15
U.S.C. § 78n-1).
5. However, such votes continue as a means of expressing shareholder
dissatisfaction. See, e.g., Nay on Pay: America’s Shareholders Find a Voice to
Condemn Undeserved Compensation, ECONOMIST, May 15, 2010, at 70, 70
(discussing negative shareholder votes at Motorola and Occidental Petroleum).
6. See, e.g., John E. Core et al., Is U.S. CEO Compensation Inefficient
Pay Without Performance?, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1142, 1160 (2005); John E. Core
& Wayne R. Guay, Is There a Case for Regulating Executive Pay in the Financial Services Industry? 2–6, 15–19 (Jan. 25, 2010) (unpublished manuscript),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1544104.
7. Core et al., supra note 6, at 1161.
8. See Michael B. Dorff, The Group Dynamics Theory of Executive Compensation, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 2025, 2029 (2007).
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works well is a distinctly minority position.9 Far more popular
is the well-worn Board Capture theory of American corporate
governance, which claims that corporations’ executives—
particularly the chief executive officer (CEO)—dominate their
boards of directors and, in essence, set their own pay.10 Board
Capture provides an underlying justification for overhauling
the entire system and its supporters have pressed for sweeping
changes to the current system.11 Obviously, there is a stark
contrast between the policies favored by Optimal Contract advocates and Board Capture theorists.
This Article aims to cut through the political and scholarly
deadlock over executive compensation by providing a new solution to potential abuses of the executive-pay-setting process. It
begins by assuming that the critics are right, and there is a
need to rein in outlier pay packages.12 We argue that a new role
should be assumed by a branch whose effectiveness is oddly
discounted by the most severe critics of executive compensation: the courts.13 We demonstrate that, contrary to received
wisdom, courts have from time to time engaged in serious review of executive compensation practices and pay packages.14
However, they usually worked within the confines of the waste
doctrine, which is much too weak to lead to meaningful scrutiny in most cases.15 Today, courts have a stronger doctrine they
9. See generally TARP Standards for Compensation and Corporate Governance, 31 C.F.R. § 30 (2009); LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY
WITHOUT PERFORMANCE 189 (2004); Lucian A. Bebchuk & Holger Spamann,
Regulating Bankers’ Pay, 98 GEO. L.J. 247, 287 (2010); J. Robert Brown, Jr.,
Returning Fairness to Executive Compensation, 84 N.D. L. REV. 1141, 1141
(2008); Miriam A. Cherry & Jarrod Wong, Clawbacks: Prospective Contract
Measures in an Era of Excessive Executive Compensation and Ponzi Schemes,
94 MINN. L. REV. 368, 368–69, 373–75 (2009); Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of
Treasury, Interim Final Rule on TARP Standards for Compensation and Corporate Governance (June 10, 2009), available at http://www.treas.gov/press/
releases/tg165.htm.
10. See BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 9, at 61–79.
11. See, e.g., Bebchuk & Spamann, supra note 9, at 283.
12. Though one of us has written in support of optimal contracting, see
Core et al., supra note 6, for purposes of this paper we assume the correctness
of the elements of Board Capture theory, and ultimately argue that advocates
of both sides should welcome the solution we propose here.
13. Cf. BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 9, at 45 (“Courts are simply ill
equipped to judge the desirability of compensation packages and policies.”).
14. See Randall S. Thomas & Kenneth J. Martin, Litigating Challenges to
Executive Pay: An Exercise in Futility?, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 569, 573–85 (2001).
15. See infra notes 131–45 and accompanying text. While we doubt that
waste can provide a meaningful limit on excessive compensation, others disagree. See generally Steven C. Caywood, Note, Wasting the Corporate Waste

2011]

EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION

849

can employ when called on to monitor abuses in executive compensation: the fiduciary duties of officers.16 As we show, recent
Delaware court decisions have given new life to officers’ fiduciary duties, not only by establishing that officers are bound by
the same fiduciary duties as are directors, but by finding that
officers’ fiduciary duty of loyalty has special application when
those officers are negotiating their own compensation agreements.17 These decisions give the state’s judiciary the power to
police executive compensation by throwing out executive employment contracts that have been negotiated disloyally—that
is, not in an arm’s-length and adversarial manner.18 Since a
key assumption of Board Capture theory is that the executive
officers of America’s public corporations (especially CEOs) dominate the boards of directors charged with managing those corporations, empowering the courts to overturn outlier compensation agreements produced by illegitimate managerial power
will attack a perceived major weakness in our corporate governance system.
In making this argument, we do not adopt Board Capture
theory wholesale. Indeed, while accepting arguendo the Board
Doctrine: How the Doctrine Can Provide a Viable Solution in Controlling Excessive Executive Compensation, 109 MICH. L. REV. 111 (2010).
16. See Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695, 708–09 (Del. 2009) (holding
that officers owe fiduciary duties of care and loyalty). Until very recently, only
a handful of articles have addressed officers’ fiduciary duties, an omission discussed more fully in Part IV. See, e.g., Donald C. Langevoort, Agency Law Inside the Corporation: Problems of Candor and Knowledge, 71 U. CIN. L. REV.
1187, 1196 (2003); A. Gilchrist Sparks, III & Lawrence A. Hamermesh, Common Law Duties of Non-Director Corporate Officers, 48 BUS. LAW. 215, 217
(1992). Despite the voluminous debate over executive compensation, only one
other article has seen officers’ fiduciary duties as a tool for limiting executive
compensation. See Douglas C. Michael, The Corporate Officer’s Independent
Duty as a Tonic for the Anemic Law of Executive Compensation, 17 J. CORP. L.
785, 786–87 (1992) (contending that officers should be found to have a “duty
not to accept unreasonable compensation”). This latter article recommends
that courts use officers’ fiduciary duties to engage in a sweeping review of
compensation for its reasonableness, but anticipates our approach in concluding that a court should include in its inquiry whether “the negotiation process
was fair and there was no overreaching.” Id. at 824.
17. See infra notes 254, 257–58, 263–66 and accompanying text.
18. Here we focus on Delaware, but we recognize that approaches taken
by Delaware’s judiciary can influence approaches in other jurisdictions, and
we hope that courts in other states would adopt the approach we advocate
here. We would also note that this approach is not restricted to employment
contracts, but could be applied with equal vigor to any other contractual
agreement negotiated between the executive and the company, including severance agreements, change-in-control agreements, bonus plans, stock option
agreements, etc.
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Capture theorists’ claim that the executive compensation system is broken, we reject another major claim made by advocates of Board Capture: that courts will refuse in almost all instances to scrutinize executive pay, instead deferring to the
superior knowledge of boards of directors, and declining to act
as human resource departments by second-guessing pay levels.19 To the contrary, a significant element in our argument is
historical, as we show that courts have—at moments in the
past—proved willing to impose heightened scrutiny on executive pay.20 With Delaware’s new emphasis on officers’ fiduciary
duties, courts can and should assume such a role again.
In Part I of this Article, we lay out the fundamental claims
of the most rigorous and articulate critique of current compensation practices—Board Capture theory.21 In Part II, we examine the development of Board Capture theory in order to
demonstrate that Board Capture—and worries over excessive
executive compensation—have a long history.22 This development began with the classic work on corporate governance by
Adolf A. Berle, Jr. and Gardiner A. Means,23 and continues in
an unbroken chain to today.24 It also formed the backdrop of
early challenges to executive compensation in the courts that
we discuss in Part III.25 There we show that, while most courts
have deployed the waste doctrine to test compensation and
have claimed that they are reluctant to closely examine executive pay levels and practices, at moments in the past courts
have indicated a willingness to apply more careful scrutiny to
pay decisions.26 Also contrary to received wisdom, shareholders
during these periods have enjoyed some success in the courts
when challenging pay arrangements.27

19. See BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 9, at 45–46 (“[J]udicial review has
failed to impose any meaningful constraint on executive pay.”). But see Thomas & Martin, supra note 14, at 571 (finding that “shareholders are successful
in at least some stage of the litigation process in a significant percentage of
these cases”).
20. See infra Part III.
21. See infra Part I.
22. See infra Part II.
23. ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER A. MEANS, THE MODERN
CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1933).
24. See, e.g., BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 9, at 23–44.
25. See infra Parts II, III.
26. See infra Part III.
27. See infra Part III.
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In Parts IV and V, we show how recent Delaware judicial
decisions on officers’ fiduciary duties can give courts in that
state a new and active role in overseeing executive compensation.28 Part IV analyzes the emergence of officers’ distinct fiduciary duties, focusing on the developments in Delaware case
law that culminated with the Delaware Supreme Court’s holding in Gantler v. Stephens29 that corporate officers owe the
same fiduciary duties as directors.30 Part V shows how these
decisions should change executive compensation practices.31 It
first discusses recent decisions by the Delaware chancery court
indicating that officers’ fiduciary duties come into play when
officers negotiate compensation agreements with their corporations.32 It then contends that courts following these decisions
can limit executive overreaching in excessive compensation
agreements by applying a rigorous standard of review to CEOs’
and other senior officers’ conduct when negotiating those compensation agreements with their firms.33 New judicial recognition of officers’ fiduciary duties, and consequent close scrutiny
of actions implicating those duties, will discipline compensation
in two ways. First, ex ante, it will improve the overall contracting environment by encouraging officers to disclose fully any
questionable negotiating behavior prior to board approval of
their compensation agreements, or simply to avoid such behavior. These steps would level the playing field by reducing information asymmetries between boards and corporate officers.
Second, ex post, it will lead courts to carefully review the negotiations that lead to compensation agreements, being especially
alert for the self-interested maneuvers that Board Capture
theorists believe characterize such negotiations.
Finally, in Part VI we return to theory. Having argued that
the shift in judicial review proposed here will be welcomed by
advocates of Board Capture, we ask how it will be viewed by
advocates of Optimal Contracting.34 We conclude that, from an
Optimal Contracting perspective, reinvigorated judicial policing
of abuses in the contracting process between boards and officers will improve both the underlying corporate governance sys28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

See infra Parts IV, V.
965 A.2d 695 (Del. 2009).
Id. at 708.
See infra Part V.
See infra text accompanying notes 254–68.
See infra text accompanying notes 300–12.
See infra Part VI.
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tem and the quality of executive employment agreements.35
Thus, the proposals made here should be welcomed by, and will
help transcend the differences between, advocates of both views
of executive compensation.
I. BOARD CAPTURE THEORY AND THE COURTS
A. BRIEF OVERVIEW
Board Capture theory,36 or what its most recent proponents, Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried, have called the Managerial Power Perspective,37 claims that executive compensation
practices in the United States benefit corporate executives at
the expense of shareholders.38 Managerial power arises, this
theory claims, because boards of directors at public companies
are beholden to the firm’s CEO and other top executives, largely due to management’s control over the director nomination
process.39 Weak boards, and more particularly weak compensation committees, do little to protect firms in their pay negotiations with officers.40 The result is executive pay that is both excessive, in that it exceeds what a competitive market for
managerial talent characterized by adversarial arm’s-length
bargaining would produce, and poorly designed, in that it is not
sufficiently tied to the executive’s performance.41
Without the captured board to act as their faithful agent,
shareholders are left with no other meaningful checks on executive pay.42 Shareholders’ other tools for influencing execu35. See infra Part VI.
36. See Randall S. Thomas, Explaining the International CEO Pay Gap:
Board Capture or Market Driven?, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1171, 1174 –75 (2004) (explaining the theory and questioning its usefulness as an explanation of international pay differences).
37. BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 9, at 61.
38. See, e.g., Thomas, supra note 36, at 1174 –75 & n.5.
39. See id. at 1174 n.5; see also COX & HAZEN, supra note 3, § 9.01 & n.3,
at 136.
40. See BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 9, at 80, 82 (noting that managers
have more power when “the board is relatively weak or ineffectual” and that
“CEOs obtain more favorable pay arrangements when they are more powerful,” and further discussing how the relationship between the CEO and members of the compensation committee affects executive compensation).
41. See id. at 6.
42. See id. at 45–58, 65–66 (discussing the failures of shareholder interventions and market forces to provide a check on executive compensation arrangements, and further noting that “outrage” by relevant outsiders will deter
the adoption of otherwise favorable executive pay arrangements, but the out-
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tive pay levels, for instance voting in favor of shareholder resolutions to restrict pay, voting against management-sponsored
option plans, or filing lawsuits, are indirect and weak.43 Recent
proposals to provide for an advisory shareholder vote on executive remuneration44 seem unlikely to change Board Capture
theorists’ belief that shareholders have no effective mechanism
for limiting top officers’ pay.45 When it comes to shareholder
voting, the New York Stock Exchange and NASDAQ rules require shareholder votes on all stock option plans,46 but Board
Capture theorists do not believe that this meaningfully constrains executive compensation levels.47 Stock option plans are
almost always approved, and even when shareholders reject
them, directors can authorize alternative forms of executive
pay.48 In sum, Board Capture theorists believe that “shareholder voting on option plans has been a weak constraint on compensation arrangements.”49
Markets represent another potential check on executive
pay levels, but according to Board Capture theorists they are
also weak constraints on managers’ remuneration.50 In the
managerial labor market, if the primary determinant of an officer being hired by another firm is the officer’s performance,
not prior pay level, then officers might as well get all they can
from their current firm because their current salaries will not
affect their marketability.51 Furthermore, if an executive rerage “must be sufficiently widespread among a relevant group” in order “to
impose significant costs”).
43. See id. at 45–52 (discussing the limited power of shareholders to intervene).
44. See, e.g., Fact Sheet: Ensuring Investors Have a “Say on Pay”, U.S.
DEPARTMENT TREASURY, http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/reports/fact_
sheet_say%20on%20pay.pdf (last visited Nov. 29, 2010) (discussing the Obama
Administration’s support for the SEC’s say-on-pay proposals); see also DoddFrank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
§ 951, 124 Stat. 1376, 1899–900 (2010) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78n-1).
45. Cf. Brian R. Cheffins & Randall S. Thomas, Should Shareholders
Have a Greater Say over Executive Pay?: Learning from the U.S. Experience, 1
J. CORP. L. STUD. 277, 307–10 (2001) (“Traditionally, when shareholders in US
companies have been called upon to consider stock option plans, such schemes
have been approved with almost no opposition.” (citation omitted)).
46. See NASDAQ LISTING RULE 5635 (2010); NYSE LISTED COMPANY
MANUAL § 303A.08 (2010).
47. See BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 9, at 49.
48. See id. at 48–51 (discussing shareholder voting on stock option plans).
49. Id. at 51.
50. See id. at 53.
51. Id. at 54.
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ceives an external offer of employment, it will raise the executive’s pay, since the competing firm must offer more than the
executive’s old pay in order to induce her to leave her current
employer.52 The market for corporate control does no better. In
principle, high executive compensation levels could lead to a
drop in a firm’s stock price, making the firm more vulnerable to
a potential takeover.53 Thus, an officer’s fear of a takeover
would in theory limit excessive pay. But, as Board Capture
theorists note, hostile takeovers are rare, and even if one occurs, departing executives are frequently given “golden parachutes” and other types of lucrative severance payments.54
Overall, Board Capture theorists believe that executives gain
far more from higher compensation today than they lose
through any increased likelihood of a takeover that could result
from excessive executive pay.55
Capital markets also cannot constrain executive pay, according to Bebchuk and Fried.56 Firms rarely raise equity capital.57 Even when they do, high executive pay does not cut off a
firm’s access to the equity markets, but simply raises the firm’s
cost of getting equity capital.58 Product markets do no better at
limiting pay; they are rarely competitive, and even when they
are, high pay seems unlikely to adversely affect a firm’s operational efficiency.59 Moreover, despite such effects, executives
would still gain more from higher pay today than they would
lose from the increased risk of firm failure tomorrow.60 In short,
market forces seem likely only to deter managers from extreme
deviations from arm’s-length contracting arrangements.61
Finally, and most important for this Article, Board Capture
theorists believe that shareholder litigation is only a very limited check on excessive executive pay plans.62 They argue that
courts are ill equipped to judge the desirability of compensation
levels and practices, and therefore judges typically apply the
highly deferential business judgment rule when evaluating ex52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

See id.
See id. at 55–56.
See id.
Id. at 56.
See id. at 56–57.
Id. at 56.
Id. at 57.
See id.
See id.
Id. at 58.
See id. at 45.
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ecutive pay levels (unless there are serious duty-of-care issues
or flaws in the board approval process).63 In fact, Bebchuk and
Fried note that “almost all cases since 1900 have refused to
overturn compensation decisions made by the boards of publicly
traded firms.”64
B. LITIGATION’S ROLE
Board Capture theorists “do not believe that the problems
of executive compensation can be addressed by judicial intervention.”65 They claim that litigation is a weak, almost nonexistent limit on executive pay because courts are too quick to
apply the business judgment rule and are loath to second-guess
boards on compensation amounts.66 In their eyes, courts lack
the institutional capacity to review the substance of executive
compensation agreements—they “are simply ill equipped to
judge the desirability of compensation packages and policies.”67
So long as corporations follow fairly easy procedural requirements—having a compensation committee composed of “nominally independent and informed directors” approve all compensation packages and seeking the advice of compensation
experts—courts will not inquire into the substance of their decisions or even look too closely at the process.68 Theoretically,
litigants can still claim that a compensation package is so egregious as to constitute waste,69 but that standard is almost never met.70 And even before they get their day in court, shareholder litigants filing a derivative suit must overcome the
demand requirement, which allows boards in almost all instances to seize control of shareholder litigation.71 In sum,
Board Capture theorists believe that so long as a board compensation committee properly papers its compensation deci63. See id. at 45–46.
64. Id. at 46 (citations omitted). But cf. Thomas & Martin, supra note 14,
at 571 (finding that shareholders are typically successful in at least some
stage of suits in which they seek to challenge executive pay).
65. BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 9, at 45.
66. See id. at 45–46.
67. Id. at 45.
68. Id. at 46.
69. One definition finds waste when “an exchange . . . is so one sided that
no business person of ordinary, sound judgment could conclude that the corporation has received adequate consideration.” Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244,
263 (Del. 2000) (citations omitted).
70. Id.
71. See BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 9, at 46–47 (discussing the demand
requirement).
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sions, receives “relevant materials[,] and spends some time examining them,” courts will not intervene.72
But what if courts’ roles in monitoring executive compensation could be strengthened? The development and implementation of clearer and more manageable doctrine concerning executive compensation should result in more aggressive judicial
monitoring of executive overreaching and improved contracting
between boards and executives. There is evidence that stronger
judicial review has had this effect for closely held corporations.73 Courts, for instance, have applied a reasonableness test
to determine for tax purposes whether executive pay is in part
a disguised dividend to officers/shareholders.74 Enhanced judicial scrutiny under the reasonableness test (as well as the predominance of inside directors) has significantly increased
shareholders’ success rates when they bring executive compensation cases against close corporations.75
If judicial review could be improved, then it would have at
least two beneficial effects on the relationship between boards
and officers. First, from an ex ante perspective, officers would
have strong incentives to avoid altogether, or at least make full
disclosure of, any potentially improper relationships or conflicts
of interest that they might have in their negotiations with their
firms in order to head off potential litigation. This would reduce
information asymmetries between directors and officers.
Second, from an ex post perspective, stricter scrutiny could
remedy situations where a contract is negotiated one-sidedly in
favor of an executive, thereby curing any overreaching in contract negotiations.
The approach we propose—giving courts greater power to
scrutinize executive compensation to both improve the negotiating environment and to curb particularly one-sided negotiations—may appear a radical break from past practices. It is
not. In the next two Parts, we will show that neither the fears
that Board Capture has skewed executive compensation, nor
courts’ attempts to curb it, are new.
72. Id. at 48.
73. Thomas & Martin, supra note 14, at 586–87.
74. Detlev Vagts, Challenges to Executive Compensation: For the Markets
or the Courts?, 8 J. CORP. L. 231, 252–61 (1983) (contending that courts examining CEO pay at public companies should borrow from tax and close corporation cases to test for reasonableness of compensation by comparing compensation levels of executives at similar firms).
75. Thomas & Martin, supra note 14, at 586–87, 610.
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II. THE EVOLUTION OF BOARD CAPTURE THEORY
While Board Capture theory and its impact on executive
compensation have received a lot of recent press,76 fears that
managers will use their powers to divert corporate resources
from shareholders to themselves are as old as the modern corporation. In The Modern Corporation and Private Property, the
foundational text of modern corporate governance,77 Berle and
Means warned that the separation of ownership and control
that marked the modern corporation gave management “almost
absolute power” over the corporation, including virtually uncontrolled “power of confiscation of a part of the profit stream
and even of the underlying corporate assets.”78 Here already is
the kernel of the Board Capture hypothesis: the worry that
managers will have unchecked power over corporate assets
and, thereby, be able to serve their own interests rather than
those of shareholders. While this account by Berle and Means
differs from that presented by Bebchuk and Fried, they share
the underlying suspicion that managers’ rewards were, or could
easily be, set by themselves and disconnected from shareholder
value.79
The belief that executive compensation was systematically
skewed by executives’ power and was set without regard to increased shareholder value first became widespread in the early
1930s.80 At that time, disclosures revealed that executives at a
number of major corporations, including American Tobacco,
Bethlehem Steel, and National City Bank, had received large
bonuses in years when shareholders received no dividends, and
that top executives at those firms took home “then-unthinkable
sums” of over $1 million a year.81 In response to what the public perceived as an epidemic of executive overcompensation,
76. Bebchuk and Fried discuss the “official story” of executive compensation, which they claim underlies corporate law on executive compensation and
assumes that boards mitigate any agency problems created in negotiation of executive compensation agreements. BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 9, at 15–18.
77. See, e.g., William W. Bratton, Berle and Means Reconsidered at the
Century’s Turn, 26 J. CORP. L. 737, 737–38 (2001).
78. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 23, at 127, 247.
79. See BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 9, at 121; BERLE & MEANS, supra
note 23, at 138. Berle and Means differ most notably from Bebchuk and Fried
in that they rarely differentiated between directors and officers, but lumped
them together as “management.” Id. at 127.
80. See Harwell Wells, “No Man Can Be Worth $1,000,000 a Year”: The
Fight over Executive Compensation in 1930s America, 44 U. RICH. L. REV. 689,
691 (2010).
81. Id. at 690, 709–15.
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Congress considered numerous proposals, including punitive
taxation of compensation packages, and included compensation
disclosure requirements in the Securities Act of 1933 and the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934.82 Although there appears no
way to gauge whether most executives were paid too much during this decade (i.e., whether their compensation systematically
exceeded what would have been paid as the outcome of arm’slength bargaining), it is clear that most Americans believed
this to be so.83 In a 1936 poll, Fortune magazine found that
most respondents, even those in the highest income bracket,
thought that executives were overpaid.84
Executive compensation faded as an issue at the end of the
1930s.85 It was slow to reemerge as a topic after the war, due in
large part to the fact that levels of compensation were not as
high after the war as during the 1930s.86 During the late 1940s,
average executive compensation actually decreased.87 While it
resumed its growth in the early 1950s, it grew at an average
rate of only 0.8 percent a year, below average income growth.88
By one estimate, executive compensation did not again attain
the heights of the early 1930s until the end of the 1980s.89
That compensation was lower in the postwar era did not,
however, lead observers to conclude that it was optimal or
linked to shareholder value. Running through discussions of
executive compensation, from the 1930s to today, is a consistent suspicion that it is set not by market forces, but by executives themselves. While one observer claimed that the prevailing assumption in the 1950s was that “the executive is paid at
a rate roughly equal to his marginal contribution to company
82. See id. at 737–45.
83. Cf. id. at 707 (noting the belief that “some sums were so large that no
one could ‘deserve’ them”).
84. Big Salaries, FORTUNE, Apr. 1936, at 215.
85. Wells, supra note 80, at 758.
86. See generally GEORGE THOMAS WASHINGTON & V. HENRY ROTHSCHILD,
2ND, COMPENSATING THE CORPORATE EXECUTIVE 296–310 (rev. ed. 1951) (discussing wage stabilization); Mark Leff, The Politics of Sacrifice on the Home
Front During World War II, 77 J. AM. HIST. 1296, 1298–306 (1991) (discussing
the push for wage limits during World War II).
87. Carola Frydman & Raven E. Saks, Executive Compensation: A New View
from a Long-Term Perspective, 1936–2005, 23 REV. FIN. STUD. 2099, 2106 (2010).
88. Id.; see also Carola Frydman, Learning from the Past: Trends in Executive Compensation over the 20th Century, 55 CESIFO ECON. STUD. 458, 473
(2009).
89. Michael C. Jensen & Kevin J. Murphy, CEO Incentives—It’s Not How
Much You Pay, but How, HARV. BUS. REV., May–June 1990, at 138, 138–39.
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profits,” commentators frequently challenged this view.90 Much
was made of studies that showed a close correlation, not between executive compensation and firm profits, but between
compensation and firm size, and some economists saw in this a
tool by which wily executives could increase their compensation
at shareholders’ expense.91 In 1957, William Baumol argued
that the correlation between executive compensation and firm
size could systemically skew managerial behavior, leading
managers motivated by “personal self-interest” to seek to maximize sales rather than, presumably, shareholder value in the
form of profits.92 In 1963, Oliver Williamson made an even
more direct connection between managerial power and executive compensation, arguing that increased managerial discretion in the modern corporation created “a systematic effect on
resource-allocation decisions.”93 This power enabled managers
to increase their own emoluments, a term Williamson defined
as economic rents, “not [as] a return to entrepreneurial capacity but rather . . . from the strategic advantage that the management possesses in the distribution of the returns to monopoly power.”94 When managers were prevented by the tax code or
public scrutiny from taking additional compensation in higher
90. Herbert A. Simon, The Compensation of Executives, 20 SOCIOMETRY
32, 35 (1957). Simon describes this as the “usual economic explanation,” but in
retrospect what is striking is how many scholars dissented from it. See, e.g.,
id. The main proponent of the view that compensation was linked to profits
was probably the McKinsey & Co. consultant Arch Patton, and even he conceded that there was also a relationship between compensation and firm size.
See ARCH PATTON, MEN, MONEY AND MOTIVATION at vii, 76–77 (1961).
91. See, e.g., Robert J. Howe, Price Tags for Executives, HARV. BUS. REV.,
May–June 1956, at 94, 98; Joseph W. McGuire et al., Executive Incomes, Sales
and Profits, 52 AM. ECON. REV. 753, 755–61 (1962) (finding a relationship between current executive compensation and past sales); see also Xavier Gabaix
& Augustin Landier, Why Has CEO Pay Increased So Much?, 123 Q.J. ECON.
49, 50, 67–69 (2008) (finding that the size of a firm explains much recent
growth in CEO pay); Richard L. Shorten, Jr., Note, An Overview of the Revolt
Against Executive Compensation, 45 RUTGERS L. REV. 121, 141–43 (1992) (discussing historical connections between firm size and executive compensation).
92. WILLIAM J. BAUMOL, BUSINESS BEHAVIOR, VALUE AND GROWTH 46–47
(1959). Baumol was not the only writer of the era who believed that management was no longer required to maximize profits and, more generally, that
management was the effective controller of the corporation. See generally
JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, THE NEW INDUSTRIAL STATE (1967); ROBIN
MARRIS, THE ECONOMIC THEORY OF ‘MANAGERIAL’ CAPITALISM (1964); Henry
L. Tosi, Theory of Managerial Capitalism, in THEORIES OF ORGANIZATION 169,
169 (Henry L. Tosi ed., 2009).
93. Oliver E. Williamson, Managerial Discretion and Business Behavior,
53 AM. ECON. REV. 1032, 1032 (1963).
94. Id. at 1035.
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wages, he concluded, they would take them through perquisites
which were “much less visible rewards to the management than
salary and hence are less likely to provoke stockholder or labor
dissatisfaction.”95
Neither was the board believed to be a significant check on
executive self-dealing. The term Board Capture was not used in
the 1950s, but similar ideas were commonplace. The law held
then, as it does now, that the board of directors was the “supreme and original authority” in the corporation,96 but the general perception was that power was held by a corporation’s
chief executive.97 In an era before adoption of the model of a
“monitoring” board, the board of directors was more often seen
as a sort of cabinet of advisors to the chief executive, rather
than as a supervisory body.98 This was reflected by the ubiquity
of the “inside” board, which consisted of a majority of directors
who were either corporate officers or otherwise affiliated with
the firm.99 According to data assembled by Jeffrey Gordon, in
1950 approximately half of all directors of a sample of large
public firms were “inside” directors, with another quarter being
“affiliated” directors, a pattern that would persist into the
1970s.100 In 1958, the management consultant and board expert Everett Smith wrote that, “for all practical purposes, the
board is a creature of the chief executive.”101 Thirteen years
95. Id.
96. HENRY WINTHROP BALLANTINE, BALLANTINE ON CORPORATIONS 119
(rev. ed. 1946).
97. Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Rise of Independent Directors in the United
States, 1950–2005: Of Shareholder Value and Stock Market Prices, 59 STAN. L.
REV. 1465, 1511 (2007).
98. Jeffrey Gordon dates the rise of the monitoring model of the board of
directors to the 1970s. Id. at 1514; see also STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, THE NEW
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 160–61 (2008) (discussing
the emergence of a monitoring board). While discredited today, there was a tradition of regarding an “internal board” as an improvement on other models. In
the 1930s, there was a widespread perception that boards had often failed because of uninvolved outside directors. One study done by the Temporary National Economic Commission in 1940 reported that “the only boards that functioned
were those with a ‘hearty sprinkling of members who were officers.’” Philip A.
Loomis, Jr. & Beverly K. Rubman, Corporate Governance in Historical Perspective, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 141, 157 (1979) (quoting TNEC Monograph No. 11).
99. See THE DIRECTOR LOOKS AT HIS JOB 139 (Courtney C. Brown & E.
Everett Smith eds., 1958) (writing of the “usual board, composed of a number
of operating management supplemented by outsiders who come together for
perhaps part of a day once a month”).
100. See Gordon, supra note 97, at 1472–76, app. at 1565.
101. E. Everett Smith, Put the Board of Directors to Work!, HARV. BUS.
REV., May–June 1958, at 41, 43.
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later Myles Mace wrote in his classic study Directors: Myth and
Reality, that, in a public corporation with dispersed shareholders, “the president . . . typically does have the de facto powers
to control the enterprise, and with these powers of control it is
the president who . . . determines in large part what the board
of directors does or does not do.”102
With no evidence either that executive pay was closely correlated to shareholder value or that the board was a significant
check on managers’ actions, many concluded that executive
compensation was set not by the market but by executives
themselves. That was the popular impression. In a survey of
shareholders in 1958, the business journalist James Livingston
asserted that executives had the “power to overpay themselves,” and that an executive making a compensation contract
was “tantamount to making a contract with himself.”103 Academic studies bolstered this view. In an influential 1956 article,
the economist David Roberts examined the market for executives and concluded that there was not much of one.104 His evidence showed that the vast majority of executives were promoted from within their firms, that few executives ever
changed firms (“extreme immobility is the general case”), and
that low-paying firms did not tend to lose executives at a greater rate than other firms.105 These findings, he argued, seriously
weakened “the concept of a ‘market for executives,’ and accordingly [supported the claim that] market forces can be expected
to exert only a loose constraint over the firm’s executive compensation.”106
Even before these studies, George T. Washington and Henry Rothschild, the authors of the era’s leading text on executive
compensation, had noted that managers in corporations without strong external investor involvement tended to be paid
more.107 This finding strongly hinted at managerial power over
102. MYLES L. MACE, DIRECTORS: MYTH AND REALITY 191 (1971).
103. J.A. LIVINGSTON, THE AMERICAN STOCKHOLDER 222, 230 (1958); accord 1 GEORGE THOMAS WASHINGTON & V. HENRY ROTHSCHILD, 2ND,
COMPENSATING THE CORPORATE EXECUTIVE 27 (3d ed. 1962) (discussing the
many arguments “that management is in control of the company, sits on both
sides of the table, and is thus able to fix its own pay without regard for the interests of stockholders”).
104. See David R. Roberts, A General Theory of Executive Compensation
Based on Statistically Tested Propositions, 70 Q.J. ECON. 270, 293 (1956).
105. Id. at 293 n.5.
106. Id. at 293.
107. WASHINGTON & ROTHSCHILD, supra note 86, at 419.
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compensation: “Corporations whose managements are not subject to control by large stockholders or by financial interests
tend to give higher rewards to management than companies in
which those controls are present.”108 They later acknowledged
that, in salary negotiations, “the company’s representative
. . . may not be sufficiently hard-boiled in his attitude, particularly where one of the present managers is concerned. Lack of
effective bargaining on behalf of the stockholders’ interest has
sometimes been apparent.”109 In 1958, Professors Robert Mautz
and Gerald Rock went further: “In the final analysis managerial compensation is not controlled by shareholders; it is not controlled by directors; it is not controlled by the courts. . . . The
ultimate present control is the integrity and conscientiousness
of management.”110
Executive compensation continued to be a concern through
the 1960s and 1970s,111 but the modern debate over compensation was not rekindled until the end of that decade. Then, executives’ compensation—particularly the compensation of
CEOs—began to grow at an accelerating pace even as average
workers’ wages stagnated and concern spread about whether
executives were providing American firms with effective leadership against overseas challengers.112 The broad trends are
well-known. In 1965, the average U.S. CEO of a major company
earned twenty-four times more than a typical worker; in 1989,
the CEO earned seventy-one times more than a typical worker;
by 2007, the CEO earned 275 times more than a typical worker.113

108. Id.
109. Id. at 23.
110. Robert B. Mautz & Gerald W. Rock, The Wages of Management, 11 U.
FLA. L. REV. 474, 508 (1958).
111. The academic debate had its twists and turns. In the 1970s, for instance, following a work by Wilbur Lewellen and Blaine Huntsman, some studies did find correlations between compensation and profits. Shorten, supra
note 91, at 142 (citing Wilbur G. Lewellen & Blaine Huntsman, Managerial
Pay and Corporate Performance, 60 AM. ECON. REV. 710, 717–18 (1970)).
112. GRAEF S. CRYSTAL, IN SEARCH OF EXCESS: THE OVERCOMPENSATION
OF AMERICAN EXECUTIVES 27, 30 (1991).
113. LAWRENCE MISHEL ET AL., THE STATE OF WORKING AMERICA
2008/2009, at 220 (2009) (comparing CEO pay at 350 large, publicly owned industrial and service companies against the typical hourly wage of production/nonsupervisory workers).
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In an effort to explain these results, scholars again turned
their attention to managerial power.114 In a 1977 critique of
high compensation, John C. Baker, who had pioneered the
study of executive compensation forty years prior, identified
executives’ power as a key reason for rising compensation.115
“Although approval by the board of directors and stockholders
may be required,” he wrote, “the final agreement on executive
rewards lies with the senior management echelon. No group in
the power structure is more influential in deciding their rewards than the involved executives themselves.”116 Nor did the
board exercise much supervision over compensation. With inside directors being corporate officers, and so dependent on the
executive, and outside directors also “beholden to top management” for their position, the notion that the board would “independently exercise final power over the adoption of compensation programs” was mistaken.117 Intriguingly, Baker also
anticipated future work on executive compensation when he
identified “[c]onsultants, accounting firms, lawyers, and others”
as playing “a far more important role than is generally recognized” in setting compensation levels, pointing out that these
groups were also beholden to management, depending “on senior executive approval for their substantial fees[,] and their
continuing employment.”118
By the 1990s, such criticisms were voiced by many critics
of executive compensation.119 Perhaps the best known was the
compensation consultant Graef Crystal, who in his 1991 book,
In Search of Excess, launched an attack on executive compensation practices that anticipated the Board Capture thesis.120
Crystal explicitly rejected the claim that high executive pay
was the result of arm’s-length negotiations between informed
buyers and sellers, and instead argued that it was a product of

114. Although some scholars pointed to managerial power, others disagreed. Cf. Kevin J. Murphy, Top Executives Are Worth Every Nickel They Get,
HARV. BUS. REV., Mar.–Apr. 1986, at 125 (arguing that “[t]he pay and performance of top executives are strongly and positively related”).
115. See John C. Baker, Are Corporate Executives Overpaid?, HARV. BUS.
REV., July–Aug. 1977, at 51, 53.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. See, e.g., CRYSTAL, supra note 112, at 42–50.
120. See id. passim.
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the power chief executives systematically wielded over their
boards.121
In the legal academy, Charles Elson identified Board Capture as a major problem in a series of articles in which he
pointed to managerial domination of the board as a major cause
of excessive executive compensation. As a solution, he advocated for changes in the way directors were compensated as a
way to “break management’s grip on the board.”122 The idea resurfaced again in Bebchuk, Fried, and David I. Walker’s 2002
article, Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the Design of
Executive Compensation,123 and of course most recently in Bebchuk and Fried’s book, Pay Without Performance.124
Neither popular nor scholarly dissatisfaction with executive compensation is new; nor, as we show below, have courts
always been complacent when it comes to how much companies
pay executives. In fact, Board Capture theory has formed the
backdrop of judicial review for the last several decades. The difficult question has been what, if anything, courts would actually do about executive compensation.

121. See id. at 226–27 (describing the compensation committee as “at the
mercy of whatever the CEO wants to tell them,” and describing the CEO as
“boss of all the outside directors”). Crystal rejects the notion that the compensation system is fundamentally sound, and charges that it is “rotten to the
core.” Id. at 29–31. Understandably, he also gives a prominent role to compensation consultants, whom he sees as beholden to the CEO. Id.
122. Charles M. Elson, Director Compensation and the ManagementCaptured Board—The History of a Symptom and a Cure, 50 SMU L. REV. 127,
127, 133 (1996); see also Charles M. Elson, Executive Overcompensation—A
Board-Based Solution, 34 B.C. L. REV. 937, 947–48 (1993); Charles M. Elson,
The Duty of Care, Compensation, and Stock Ownership, 63 U. CIN. L. REV.
649, 650–51 (1995). Other legal scholars had recognized far earlier that whatever the law’s dictates “most of the powers supposedly vested in the board are
actually vested in the executives.” Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Legal Models of
Management Structure in the Modern Corporation: Officers, Directors, and Accountants, 63 CALIF. L. REV. 375, 376 (1975); see also Michael, supra note 16,
at 823 (“Executive compensation in public corporations has grown out of control because the duty to control it has been placed by the law largely in the
hands of those who have no ability to do so: the board of directors.”).
123. Lucian Bebchuk et al., Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the
Design of Executive Compensation, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 751, 751 (2002).
124. BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 9, at 61–74.
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III. EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION IN THE COURTS: A
SHORT HISTORY
Courts, including Delaware courts, have long been wary of
second-guessing executive compensation.125 Contrary to the
views of some Board Capture theorists, however, this does not
mean that courts have never been willing to inquire into executive compensation at public corporations. At a number of points
over the last century, courts have threatened higher scrutiny
for executive pay: the executive compensation cases of the
1930s,126 the Delaware courts’ stock options cases in the
1950s127 and 1960s, and most recently in the Disney decisions.128 These episodes show that judges have at times been
troubled by executive compensation levels and practices and
have moved to rein them in.129 They also show, though, that
courts have been frustrated by their inability to determine
what constitutes appropriate pay, and unwilling simply to
second-guess pay decisions or impose their own determinations
of fairness on executive compensation.130 One of the virtues of
the approach this Article presents is that it responds to the
need to monitor executive pay by allowing state courts to engage in familiar analysis of board decisionmaking processes rather than asking judges to become pay czars.
Courts’ first major brush with executive compensation at
public corporations occurred in a series of cases in the early
1930s.131 Perhaps the most famous challenged a longstanding
executive bonus plan at American Tobacco. The challenge
reached the U.S. Supreme Court in 1933 and resulted in what

125. COX & HAZEN, supra note 3, § 11.05, at 227.
126. See Wells, supra note 80, at 717–37.
127. See Lewis v. Vogelstein, 699 A.2d 327, 336–37 (Del. Ch. 1997).
128. See In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693 (Del. Ch.
2005), aff’d, 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006); In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig.,
731 A.2d 342 (Del. Ch. 1998), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Brehm v.
Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000).
129. Broad assertions of judicial inactivity in the area of executive compensation also ignore studies showing that, despite courts’ general deference to
board decisions, shareholder suits challenging executive compensation practices at public and close corporations have enjoyed significant success at many
stages of the litigation process. Thomas & Martin, supra note 14, at 571.
130. COX & HAZEN, supra note 3, § 11.05, at 228.
131. This episode is discussed at greater length in Wells, supra note 80, at
717–37. Before the 1930s, courts did scrutinize compensation decisions at close
corporations in response to allegations of minority oppression or tax avoidance. Id. at 704 –05.
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appeared to be a landmark decision.132 In that case, Rogers v.
Hill, the plaintiffs argued that the receipt of a bonus of over
$1 million by American Tobacco president G.W. Hill was so
large as to violate the “waste” doctrine forbidding spoliation or
gift of corporate assets.133 In a unanimous decision, the Court
appeared to agree—or at least agree that there was a point at
which compensation could be so large as to constitute waste, irrespective of whether the compensation award was tainted by
fraud or self-dealing.134 The rule, the Court held, was that if “a
bonus payment has no relation to the value of services for
which it is given, it is in reality a gift in part and the majority
stockholders have no power to give away corporate property
against the protest of the minority.”135 The Court remanded to
the district court for determination of whether the payment
met this standard and so constituted waste.136
Rogers was a complex case with unusual facts. For one, the
challenged bonus plan was not the result of the American Tobacco board’s deliberation, but was dictated by a bylaw, in place
since 1912, allotting senior managers a fixed percentage of the
firm’s profits.137 At the time Rogers was decided, many saw it
as the harbinger of greater judicial oversight of executive compensation and, specifically, greater scrutiny of large pay packages.138 Its promise, however, was not fulfilled. The case settled
out of court before the district court had a chance to pass on
whether Hill’s bonus constituted waste.139 While a number of
other suits were filed against public corporations during the
rest of the decade, each alleging that compensation was so
large as to constitute waste, in none did the court ultimately
find that the compensation constituted waste.140
132. Rogers v. Hill, 289 U.S. 582 (1933). On the case’s convoluted history,
see Wells, supra note 80, at 717–27. While the decision in Rogers is terse, it
appears to rest on federal common law. Before Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304
U.S. 64 (1938), litigants could file claims in federal courts, and so take advantage of the federal common law of corporations, which in effect competed with
Delaware common law. Bratton, supra note 77, at 768 & n.210 (discussing federal common law of corporations pre-Erie).
133. Rogers, 289 U.S. at 591.
134. Id. at 589–91.
135. Id. at 591–92 (citation omitted).
136. Id. at 592.
137. Id. at 584 –85.
138. See Wells, supra note 80, at 717.
139. See WASHINGTON & ROTHSCHILD, supra note 86, at 390–91.
140. In some cases, though, courts found that boards had miscalculated bonus payments and found the board liable for sums paid that they had not
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More significantly, by the late 1930s courts that were
asked to determine whether a compensation package constituted waste effectively threw up their hands at the exercise,
judging themselves unequipped to second-guess a legitimate
business decision to pay an executive a particular amount.141 In
an influential 1939 case, McQuillen v. National Cash Register
Co., the court declined to find a stock option grant to the president of NCR wasteful.142 It instead drew a distinction between
“wasteful” compensation and “excessive” compensation: “[T]he
former is unlawful, the latter is not.”143 Waste should only be
found, it held, where there has been “a failure to relate the
amount of compensation to the needs of the particular situation
by any recognized business practices, honestly, even though
unwisely adopted,—namely, the result of bad faith, or of a total
neglect of or indifference to such practices.”144 In Heller v. Boylan, a 1941 case that involved yet another challenge to bonus
payments at American Tobacco, a New York court was even
more blunt about its incapacity to judge the substance of executive compensation decisions:
Courts are ill-equipped to solve or even to grapple with these entangled economic problems. Indeed, their solution is not within the juridical province. Courts are concerned that corporations be honestly and
fairly operated by its directors, with the observance of the formal requirements of the law; but what is reasonable compensation for its officers is primarily for the stockholders.145

Court battles over executive compensation dwindled at
decade’s end.146 Executive pay would not again become an issue
for the courts until the late 1940s when a new round of litigatechnically authorized, thus providing at least one check on careless compensation procedures. See Winkelman v. Gen. Motors Corp., 39 F. Supp. 826, 835
(S.D.N.Y. 1940); Gallin v. Nat’l City Bank, 281 N.Y.S. 795, 807 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1935) (referee’s report); Gallin v. Nat’l City Bank, 273 N.Y.S. 87, 119–20 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1934) (appointing a referee to report on executive compensation).
141. See, e.g., McQuillen v. Nat’l Cash Register Co., 27 F. Supp. 639, 651
(D. Md. 1939), aff’d, 112 F.2d 877 (4th Cir. 1940) (“It is not intended that the
courts shall be called upon to make a yearly audit and adjust salaries.” (quoting Seitz v. Union Brass & Metal Mfg. Co., 189 N.W. 586, 587–88 (Minn.
1922))); Heller v. Boylan, 29 N.Y.S.2d 653, 680 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1941) (holding
that shareholders have the responsibility to determine what is reasonable
“compensation for [their] officers”); see also Shorten, supra note 91, at 146
(“The determination that compensation is excessive or unreasonable is one
that courts are ordinarily loath to make.”).
142. McQuillen, 27 F. Supp. at 650–53.
143. Id. at 653.
144. Id.
145. Heller, 29 N.Y.S.2d at 680.
146. Wells, supra note 80, at 758.
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tion was sparked not by public outrage but by changes in the
tax code. During and after World War II, marginal tax rates
were startlingly high; in 1950, the rate was eighty-nine percent
for incomes above $100,000, rising to ninety-one percent for incomes above $200,000.147 In 1950, however, the tax code was
altered148 to provide favorable treatment for restricted stock options.149 Executives receiving stock options as compensation
were allowed to delay recognizing income from receipt of options and to have the options taxed at a far lower capital gains
rate, so long as they met certain requirements.150 Understandably, this made stock options very popular.151 Before 1950, options were rarely used in compensation packages; by 1961,
most companies listed on the New York Stock Exchange included stock options in their executive compensation plans.152
As use of stock options increased, so did litigation over
them. During the 1950s, the prevalent issue concerning executive compensation in the Delaware courts was the validity of

147. FEDERAL INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX RATES HISTORY, 1913–2010, TAX
FOUND. (Sept. 23, 2009), http://www.taxfoundation.org/files/fed_individual_
rate_history-20100923.pdf (for married persons filing separately).
148. Revenue Act of 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-814, § 218, 64 Stat. 906, 942–44.
149. ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE LAW § 6.2.1, at 203 (1986). Stock
options had long been allowed in corporate law. See JOHN C. BAKER,
EXECUTIVE SALARIES AND BONUS PLANS 196–97 (1938); BERLE & MEANS, supra note 23, at 180–85. But these were little used in executive compensation
plans until the tax changes made them favorable in 1950. See 2 GEORGE
THOMAS WASHINGTON & HENRY V. ROTHSCHILD, 2ND, COMPENSATING THE
CORPORATE EXECUTIVE 569 (3d ed. 1962).
150. CLARK, supra note 149, § 6.2.1, at 203. The most significant requirement being that they hold the options for at least two years before exercising
them and hold the stock resulting from the exercise for at least six months. See
§ 218, 64 Stat. at 942.
151. 2 WASHINGTON & ROTHSCHILD, supra note 149, at 569; see also CLARK,
supra note 149, § 6.2.1, at 203 (“[A] substantial majority of large public corporations adopted restricted stock option plans during the 1950s and 1960s.”).
152. See 2 WASHINGTON & ROTHSCHILD, supra note 149, at 569 & n.3.
Stock options’ popularity continued to vary over the decades. When the tax
code was changed in 1964 to remove some of their benefits, use of stock options declined. CLARK, supra note 149, § 6.2.1, at 203–04. When in the 1980s
new emphasis was placed on compensation means that would link pay to performance, use of stock options again rose. Brian J. Hall, What You Need to
Know About Stock Options, 78 HARV. BUS. REV. 121, 123–24 (2000). And use of
stock options became still more prevalent when, in 1992, Congress changed
the tax code to reduce the deductibility of non-performance-based compensation. See Ian Dew-Becker, How Much Sunlight Does it Take to Disinfect a
Boardroom? A Short History of Executive Compensation Regulation in America, 55 CESIFO ECON. STUD. 434, 446–48 (2009).
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corporate stock option grants.153 In the stock options cases,
shareholder-plaintiffs challenged option grants to executives by
contending that options given as part of executive compensation plans were effectively given without consideration (i.e., in
a completely one-sided transaction) and so constituted waste.154
Delaware’s courts were initially receptive to this argument, and
in two 1952 decisions, the courts promised to provide substantive scrutiny of a method at the cutting edge of executive compensation.155
Corporations’ power to grant options was not directly at issue,156 as Delaware’s courts had long upheld the validity of
stock option grants.157 The courts had also, though, recited a
rule suggesting that review of such grants would demand more
than simply that they do not constitute waste: if options were
given for services, the services’ “value must bear some reasonable relation to the value of the right given.”158 In 1952, the Delaware Supreme Court decided two major cases challenging the
validity of corporations’ executive stock option plans, Gottlieb v.
Heyden Chemical Corp.159 and Kerbs v. California Eastern Air-

153. Harry G. Henn, Book Review, 49 CORNELL L.Q. 574, 576 n.14 (1964).
154. The line of cases discussed here is reviewed in Lewis v. Vogelstein, 699
A.2d 327, 336–38 (Del. Ch. 1997), and also discussed in, among others,
Charles M. Yablon, Overcompensating: The Corporate Lawyer and Executive
Pay, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1867, 1902–04 (1992) (reviewing CRYSTAL, supra note
112), and Shorten, supra note 91, at 146 n.86. For further discussion, see
CLARK, supra note 149, § 6.2.2, at 213–17, explaining different court decisions
regarding consideration, and 2 WASHINGTON & ROTHSCHILD, supra note 149,
at 607–08, noting that “[e]ach individual to whom a stock option is granted
shall, as consideration for the grant thereof, agree to remain in the employ of
the Corporation.”
155. See Gottlieb v. Heyden Chem. Corp., 90 A.2d 660, 664 (Del. 1952);
Kerbs v. Cal. E. Airways, Inc., 90 A.2d 652, 656–58 (Del. 1952). Even observers at the time noted the oddity of Delaware’s courts imposing heightened
scrutiny of stock options. One wrote that in stock option litigation, the Delaware courts during the 1950s “demonstrated an un-Delaware-like approach.”
Henn, supra note 153, at 576 n.14.
156. They were specifically provided for in Delaware’s corporation law in
1929, and allowed by the courts before then. See Grimes v. Alteon, Inc., 804
A.2d 256, 263–64 & n.16 (Del. 2002) (discussing the history of stock options in
Delaware).
157. See id. at 263–64.
158. Rosenthal v. Burry Biscuit Corp., 60 A.2d 106, 109 (Del. Ch. 1948); see
also Wyles v. Campbell, 77 F. Supp. 343, 346–47 (D. Del. 1948) (“[W]here corporate funds are applied to incentive or other compensation of corporate officers, such remuneration must bear a reasonable relation to the value of the
services for which the funds are applied.”).
159. 90 A.2d 660.
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ways, Inc.160 In each case, the corporation’s board had approved
an options grant for senior executives, and while some directors
were recipients of the grants, in each case the corporation
sought and received shareholder ratification.161 Shareholderplaintiffs subsequently challenged the grants at both firms on
several grounds, including that the grants were given without
receipt of consideration from the executives and so constituted
waste.162 In both cases, the court held that the shareholder ratification had served to give the directors a presumption that
they acted in good faith.163 Yet it was insufficient to extinguish
the waste claim, as only a unanimous vote of shareholders
could give away corporate assets.164 The major difference between the two cases was their outcome. In Gottlieb, the Delaware Supreme Court denied summary judgment to defendants,
holding that the chancery court should determine whether
what was received by the corporation was sufficient to constitute legal consideration.165 According to the court, the test was
not whether the contracts recited consideration, but whether
consideration was actually received; if it was, “it is a judicial
responsibility to detect it and give it recognition.”166
Kerbs made clear what this meant. The test it set down required a court to review the substance of a compensation award
and not just the process followed in awarding it.167 The validity
of a stock option plan, the court held, “depends directly upon
the existence of consideration to the corporation and the inclusion in the plan of conditions, or the existence of circumstances
which may be expected to insure that the contemplated consideration will in fact pass to that corporation.”168 Under the Kerbs
test, a variety of things could be sufficient consideration, including retention of an employee’s services, but there needed to
be “a reasonable relationship between the value of the services
to be rendered by the employee and the value of the options
granted as an inducement or compensation.”169 While the court
refused to set down “a minimum set of prescribed requirements
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.

90 A.2d 652.
See Gottlieb, 90 A.2d at 662–63; Kerbs, 90 A.2d at 655–56.
See Gottlieb, 90 A.2d at 662; Kerbs, 90 A.2d at 655–56.
See Gottlieb, 90 A.2d. at 663–64; Kerbs, 90 A.2d at 655, 659.
Gottlieb, 90 A.2d at 663–64; Kerbs, 90 A.2d at 656–57 & n.2.
Gottlieb, 90 A.2d at 664.
Id.
Kerbs, 90 A.2d at 656–57.
Id. at 656 (citations omitted).
Id. (citations omitted).
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that must be contained in every compensation stock option
plan,”170 it stated that “there must be some circumstance which
may reasonably be regarded as sufficient to insure that the
corporation will receive that which it desires to obtain by granting the option.”171 California Eastern Airways’ plan, the court
held, did not meet this test.172 The options were granted to employees as inducement to keep them in the firm’s employ, but
the employees could immediately exercise all the options either
while employed at the airways or within six months of leaving
the firm.173 Because the options grant did not ensure that the
airline would “receive that which it desire[d] to obtain by granting the option,” (i.e., the employee’s continued service), the options were invalid as waste.174
At the moment when stock options were becoming vital to
executive compensation plans—were “the vogue,” as the Kerbs
court put it175—the Delaware Supreme Court imposed a heightened level of scrutiny on their use. Kerbs set out a two-part
test, asking (1) whether there was a reasonable relationship between the options and consideration, and (2) whether the circumstances were sufficient to ensure that the corporation actually received the benefit sought.176 Although the court
invoked the waste standard, this test was, as Chancellor Allen
later noted, “rather distant from the substance of a waste
standard of review[,] . . . seem[ing] to be a form of heightened
scrutiny that is now sometimes referred to as an intermediate
or proportionality review.”177
Yet soon enough Delaware’s courts would retreat from imposing heightened scrutiny on executive compensation plans.
True, the rules set down in the 1952 cases remained good law
for the rest of the decade.178 But in 1953, Delaware’s legislature
amended its corporation law in response to dicta in the cases to
make clear that the board’s judgment concerning consideration
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.

Id. at 657–58.
Id. at 657.
Id. at 657–58.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 656.
Id.; see also Lewis v. Vogelstein, 699 A.2d 327, 337 (Del. Ch. 1997).
Lewis, 699 A.2d at 337.
Cf. EDWARD P. WELCH ET AL., 1 FOLK ON THE DELAWARE GENERAL
CORPORATION LAW § 157.3.2 (5th ed. 2010) (explaining that since the decision
in Beard v. Elster, 160 A.2d 731 (Del. 1960), “the attitude of the Delaware
courts toward stock options has become quite lenient”).
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for options would be conclusive “absent fraud.”179 More significantly, in 1960 the state’s supreme court backed away from
Kerbs and Gottlieb in Beard v. Elster, a challenge to American
Airlines’s employee stock option plan.180 While the earlier cases
had set out a two-part test, Beard limited the earlier holding in
two ways. First, it held that the earlier cases should not have
been taken to require some legally cognizable consideration
(i.e., “a measurable quid pro quo”).181 Second, it limited the
sharp rule announced in Kerbs to cases where stock options had
been granted by self-interested boards.182 For situations where
approval was given by a disinterested board or committee, the
Beard court established a different rule, one that hewed more
closely to Delaware’s traditional approach to other kinds of executive compensation. In Beard, the majority of the board approving the stock option plan had been disinterested, and the
plan had also received stockholder ratification.183 In such a situation, the supreme court concluded that a court should not
apply the two-prong test established in Kerbs.184 Instead, a
court should apply the highly deferential business judgment
rule, under which a court is “precluded from substituting [its]
uninformed opinion for that of experienced business managers
. . . who have no personal interest in the outcome.”185
The court’s point was clear enough. Judges lacked the capacity to evaluate executive compensation, have at best “uninformed opinion[s],” and should normally defer to those “experienced business managers” who had actual knowledge of the
matter.186 After Beard, Delaware courts’ review of executive options grants would shift back from substantive-based to
process-based scrutiny, focusing “in practice less on attempting
independently to assess whether the corporation in fact would
receive proportional value, and more on the procedures used to
authorize . . . such grants.”187 While courts still sometimes assert that “there must be a reasonable relationship between the
179. 2 WASHINGTON & ROTHSCHILD, supra note 149, at 578–79 & n.43.
Previously the statute had only covered consideration for stock. WELCH ET AL.,
supra note 178, § 157.3.2.
180. Beard, 160 A.2d 731.
181. Id. at 736.
182. Id. at 736–37.
183. Id.
184. See id. at 737–39.
185. Id.
186. See id.
187. Lewis v. Vogelstein, 699 A.2d 327, 338 (Del. Ch. 1997).
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value of the benefits passing to the corporation and the value of
the options granted,”188 they would in fact apply the waste
test.189 Thus, judicial intervention was warranted only in the
extreme cases where there was no consideration at all190 or,
much the same thing, when no reasonable business person
could have entered into the challenged exchange.191 By 1990,
one scholar could write that in Delaware “the business judgment rule protects almost any compensation decision made by a
disinterested committee of the board.”192 In 1997, Lewis v. Vogelstein made explicit what had occurred long before by abandoning the line of cases that suggested that stock options
grants required a review of “proportionality” rather than merely the waste test.193
The 1990s could be seen from one perspective as a low
point for judicial scrutiny of executive compensation. Notably, a
number of Delaware judges began urging the abandonment of
the waste doctrine, which had long been used as a final, albeit
usually unsuccessful, claim against truly egregious compensa-

188. Pogostin v. Rice, 480 A.2d 619, 625 (Del. 1984), overruled on other
grounds by Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 254 (Del. 2000) (holding that “review of decisions of the Court of Chancery applying Rule 23.1 is de novo and
plenary,” rather than “deferential, limited to a determination of whether the
Court of Chancery abused its discretion”).
189. See Pogostin, 480 A.2d at 626 (holding that the plaintiffs did not meet
the “burden of demonstrating by particularized allegations that the Plan itself
is so devoid of a legitimate corporate purpose as to be a waste of assets”).
190. Cf. Michelson v. Duncan, 407 A.2d 211, 223 (Del. 1979) (citing Gottlieb
with regard to waste); see also Lewis, 699 A.2d at 337–38 (discussing the erosion of the test set out in Kerbs and Gottlieb).
191. See Lewis, 699 A.2d at 336. Though these tests seem to differ, in practice they asked much the same thing, and Chancellor Allen effectively equated
them in Lewis. See id.
192. Yablon, supra note 154, at 1904.
193. Lewis, 699 A.2d at 336. Lewis also illustrates the degree to which Delaware’s judiciary can, perhaps inadvertently, rewrite its own history. In Lewis,
the Chancellor paints the stock option cases as historical curiosities, and links
them to early twentieth century worries about director compensation and
stock watering. See id. The two cases that he cites discussing this both date
from the early 1920s. Id. at 336 nn.15–16 (citing Cahall v. Lofland, 114 A.2d
224 (Del. Ch. 1922); Scully v. Auto. Fin. Corp., 109 A.2d 49 (Del. Ch. 1920)).
But the stock options cases were not lingering remnants of the 1920s; rather,
they were handed down in a period when stock options were becoming a favored method of executive compensation, something Kerbs directly notes.
Kerbs v. Cal. E. Airways, Inc., 90 A.2d 652, 656 (Del. 1952). The discussion in
Lewis thus downplays the degree to which, in the stock options cases, Delaware’s courts chose to apply a higher level of scrutiny to a prevalent method of
executive compensation.
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tion.194 In one 1995 opinion, Chancellor Allen denigrated waste
claims as a “theoretical exception” to the general rule that a
court “will not review the substance of [a] corporate contract”
absent fraud or self-dealing, and wrote that the likelihood of
the existence of a case that would “meet the legal standard of
waste” was about as likely as the existence of the Loch Ness
Monster.195 In 1999, Vice Chancellor Strine was even more
blunt, describing waste as a “vestige” of discarded doctrines
and urging that the law be changed to allow a majority shareholder vote to extinguish a waste claim.196
Executive compensation did not, however, disappear from
the courts. While the 1990s saw judicial criticism of the waste
standard, outside the courtroom executive compensation remained a contentious issue as executives’ pay continued to outpace that of workers.197 It was in this environment that the
Delaware courts made another, more tentative foray into executive compensation in the Disney decisions of the early
2000s.198 Disney seemed for a time to open up a new avenue for
challenges to executive compensation: directors’ duty of good
faith, a longstanding yet ill-defined element of directors’ fiduciary duties.199
194. Waste claims may generally be seen as “losers,” but a study one of the
authors performed found that, as of 2000, plaintiffs making waste claims in
connection with executive compensation in the Delaware courts won about forty percent of the time, with a “win” defined as success at some stage of the litigation process. See Thomas & Martin, supra note 14, at 571–72. This percentage may make waste claims look more successful than they are, however, as
Delaware courts are loathe to dismiss waste claims on summary judgment.
See id. at 583 n.57.
195. Steiner v. Meyerson, No. 13139, 1995 WL 441999, at *5 (Del. Ch. July
19, 1995).
196. Harbor Fin. Partners v. Huizenga, 751 A.2d 879, 897 (Del. Ch. 1999).
197. MISHEL ET AL., supra note 113, at 220, 221 fig.3AE.
198. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693 (Del. Ch. 2005),
aff’d, 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006); In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 731
A.2d 342 (Del. Ch. 1998), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Brehm v. Eisner,
746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000).
199. Disney generated a significant literature on “good faith.” See generally
Christopher M. Bruner, Good Faith, State of Mind, and the Outer Boundaries
of Director Liability in Corporate Law, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1131, 1131
(2006) (“The inability of Delaware’s courts to identify what a corporate director’s core fiduciary duties are, let alone what the scope of those duties might
be, is one of the most pressing—and from a director’s point of view, distressing—issues in corporate law today.”); Sean J. Griffith, Good Faith Business
Judgment: A Theory of Rhetoric in Corporate Law Jurisprudence, 55 DUKE
L.J. 1, 4 (2005) (“The function of good faith in corporate law, however, is not
perfectly clear.”); Claire A. Hill & Brett McDonnell, Disney, Good Faith, and
Structural Bias, 32 J. CORP. L. 833, 855–62 (2007) (“The court created space
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The Disney cases grew out of the highly public hiring, and
shortly thereafter firing, of Michael Ovitz as president of the
Walt Disney Company.200 Ovitz was generously compensated as
Disney president, and when terminated after little more than a
year at the firm he received a severance package worth almost
$130 million.201 Shareholders filed suit, alleging, among other
things, that in Ovitz’s hiring and termination the Disney board
had violated their fiduciary duties and committed waste.202 In
1998, the chancery court granted summary judgment for the
defendants, holding that demand was not excused.203 On appeal, the Delaware Supreme Court in 2000 affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded, which allowed plaintiffs to repeal without prejudice.204 While the substance of the 2000
supreme court opinion was not especially favorable to plaintiffs—not even allowing them discovery—its rhetoric voiced
concern over both the size of the payments to Ovitz and the
processes followed by Disney’s board.205 According to the court,
it was “potentially a very troubling case on the merits.”206 As
the court explained:
[T]he compensation and termination payout for Ovitz were exceedingly lucrative, compared to Ovitz’s value to the Company; and . . . the
processes of the boards of directors in dealing with the approval and
termination of the Ovitz Employment Agreement were casual, if not
sloppy and perfunctory. . . . [T]he sheer size of the payout to Ovitz, as

for a doctrine of good faith, but it provided little guidance as to how that doctrine might work, even in cases like Disney itself.”); Elizabeth A. Nowicki, Not
in Good Faith, 60 SMU L. REV. 441, 441–43 (2007) (explaining the distinction
between “bad faith” and “not in good faith”); Hillary A. Sale, Delaware’s Good
Faith, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 456, 482–94 (2004) (explaining the “definitions for
the duty of good faith under Delaware law, and drawing some conclusion
about how it might apply in future cases”).
200. See In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 75 (Del. 2006).
201. Id.
202. Disney, 731 A.2d at 353. The discussion here deals with the challenges
relying on good faith, but it should be remembered that the plaintiffs also alleged waste.
203. See id. (“Demand . . . is not prerequisite to derivative action only if the
particularized facts alleged in the complaint create a reasonable doubt that:
(1) the directors are disinterested and independent; or (2) the challenged transaction was otherwise the product of a valid exercise of business judgment.”).
204. See Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 267 (Del. 2000) (“The portion of
paragraph 1 that dismissed ‘plaintiffs claims for breach of fiduciary duty and
waste . . . for failure to make a demand under Court of Chancery Rule 23.1,’ is
reversed only to the extent that the dismissal ordered by the Court of Chancery was with prejudice.” (alteration in original)).
205. Id.
206. Id. at 249.
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alleged, pushes the envelope of judicial respect for the business judgment of directors in making compensation decisions.207

The 2000 decision seemed to open the door for new judicial
engagement with executive compensation. While Disney was on
remand, there were additional indications that Delaware’s
judges were becoming more concerned about levels of executive
pay.208 In January 2003, Chief Justice Norman Veasey gained
media attention when he warned, in a speech about the process
for setting executive compensation, that directors who were insufficiently independent in making compensation decisions
could have their behavior “treated . . . as a breach of the fiduciary duty of good faith.”209
The chancery court generated still more attention in May
2003 when the court, on remand, denied the Disney defendants’
motion for summary judgment in a stinging opinion.210 Although careful to note that the facts discussed were taken from
plaintiffs’ pleadings and so accepted as true for purposes of
summary judgment, the opinion still painted a picture of Disney’s board as disengaged and dysfunctional.211 The directors
appeared to be under the thumb of CEO Michael Eisner and
had neglected basic duties, such as having approved the Ovitz
hiring and termination decisions without seeing a copy of his
employment agreement or asking for expert assistance.212 As
the court summarized them:
[T]he facts alleged in the new complaints suggest that the defendant
directors consciously and intentionally disregarded their responsibilities, adopting a ‘we don’t care about the risks’ attitude . . . . Put differently, all of the alleged facts, if true, imply that the director defendants knew that they were making material decisions without
adequate information and without adequate deliberation, and they

207. Id.
208. Delaware’s judges have increasingly made public comments about
trends in corporation law, paralleling their tendency to issue “hortatory opinion[s].” Edward B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter, Islands of Conscious Power:
Law, Norms, and the Self-Governing Corporation, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1619,
1679–80 (2001).
209. Tom Becker, Delaware Justice Warns Boards of Liability for Executive
Pay, WALL ST. J., Jan. 6, 2003, at A14.
210. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 825 A.2d 275, 277–78 (Del.
Ch. 2003) (“Because the facts alleged here, if true, portray directors consciously indifferent to a material issue facing the corporation, the law must be
strong enough to intervene against abuse of trust.”).
211. See id. at 287–90.
212. Id. at 278, 281.

2011]

EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION

877

simply did not care if the decisions caused the corporation and its
stockholders to suffer injury or loss.213

While the exact implications were unclear, this passage
could be read to mean that directors who knowingly acted
without adequate information and deliberation in approving an
executive compensation package had failed to satisfy their fiduciary duty to act in good faith. This was particularly significant
because actions made not in good faith are not covered by one
of the central protections provided directors by Delaware’s corporate law, the exculpatory provision allowed in Delaware
General Corporation Law (DGCL) section 102(b)(7) and included in Disney’s charter.214
For all its harsh tone and worrisome implications, though,
the decision’s import was ambiguous. Did it signal, in the wake
of continued rising executive pay and the post-Enron passage of
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act,215 that Delaware’s courts were prepared to make more searching inquiry into executive compensation decisions, relying on “good faith” as a legal tool to
second-guess noninterested decisions? Or was it merely the
product of a better-drafted plaintiffs’ complaint?216 In 2003,
many thought the former, and particularly feared that the
court’s discussion of lack of good faith by the board had created
a new avenue for director liability.217 News reports suggest as
much, and (by then) former Chief Justice Veasey reinforced
this view when he wrote in the Business Lawyer in 2004 criticizing the belief “that there is no limit to what executive compensation committees may do in fixing the compensation of
CEOs and other senior managers,” and cautioning that the
process of setting executive compensation must “be genuine,
213. Id. at 289.
214. See id. at 286 (citation omitted).
215. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.).
216. See Mark J. Roe, Delaware’s Competition, 117 HARV. L. REV. 588, 643
& n.211 (2003) (noting in the immediate aftermath of the Disney case, “[t]he
difficulty here is to sort out not so much whether Delaware shifted, but
whether its abrupt shift was due primarily to the federal gravitational pull, to
the dynamics of the litigation, or to the state’s direct perception of the underlying corporate problems”).
217. See, e.g., Joseph E. Bachelder III, ‘Disney’: Spotlight on ‘Good Faith’ and
Directors’ Liabilities, N.Y. L.J., Aug. 29, 2003, at 3 (stating that as a result of
the case, “an erosion may take place not only in the scope of protection under
§102(b)(7) [sic], but also in the traditionally assumed protection under the business judgment rule”); Patrick McGeehan, Case Could Redefine Board Member
Liability, N.Y. TIMES, June 14, 2003, at C1, available at 2003 WLNR 5236283.
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not a rote, ‘check the box’ exercise.”218 Yet, later decisions in the
Disney case did not impose on board compensation decisions
the increased scrutiny some thought the Delaware courts promised in 2003.219 In 2005, after a trial on the merits, the chancery court found that the Disney defendants had not
“breach[ed] their fiduciary duties or commit[ted] waste,”220 a
decision upheld a year later by the Delaware Supreme Court.221
Both of the later decisions were sharply critical of the directors’
decisions and methods and depicted Disney’s 1990s decisionmaking processes as falling short of best practices, but neither
decision found that the Disney directors’ actions violated their
legal duties.222 Nor would good faith prove to be an easy tool for
increased scrutiny of board decisionmaking or a means to challenge even egregiously negligent decisionmaking.223 After Disney, the Delaware Supreme Court held that good faith was neither a freestanding fiduciary duty, nor an element of the duty

218. E. Norman Veasey, Counseling Directors in the New Corporate Culture, 59 BUS. LAW. 1447, 1451 (2004).
219. Others have speculated that, following the collapse of the dot-com
bubble and Enron Corporation in 2000, Delaware’s courts briefly took a less
deferential approach as a response to possible federal corporate regulation,
and as that threat retreated, returned to traditional, deferential approaches.
See, e.g., Timothy P. Glynn, Delaware’s VantagePoint: The Empire Strikes
Back in the Post-Post Enron Era, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 91, 102–04 (2008) (summarizing the claim that Delaware courts briefly became less management
friendly post-Enron).
220. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 697 (Del. Ch.
2005), aff’d, 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006).
221. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 75 (Del. 2006).
222. See id. at 68 (“Without such a duty to act, the new board’s failure to
vote on the termination could not give rise to a breach of the duty of care or
the duty to act in good faith.”); Disney, 907 A.2d at 776 (“Because the board
was under no duty to act, they did not violate their fiduciary duty of care, and
they also individually acted in good faith.”). As others have noted, discussions
of “best practices” in Delaware decisions may well influence the behavior of
other corporate actors—they are not just pious verbiage—but they do not impose legal liability on directors for breach of their duties or for waste. See
Claire Hill & Brett McDonnell, Executive Compensation and the Optimal Penumbra of Delaware Corporation Law, 4 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 333, 362 (2009)
(discussing why directors abide by a legal “penumbra” rather than what is required by law); Edward B. Rock, Saints and Sinners: How Does Delaware Corporate Law Work?, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1009, 1016–17 (1997) (discussing how the
rhetorical approaches of the judiciary and corporate counsel in Delaware
create legal norms).
223. See Disney, 906 A.2d at 63 (stating that plaintiffs’ “verbal effort to collapse the duty to act in good faith into the duty to act with due care, is not unlike putting a rabbit into the proverbial hat and then blaming the trial judge
for making the insertion”).
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of care, but an aspect of the duty of loyalty.224 The court emphasized that a violation of the duty of good faith required
some form of deliberate or conscious choice—an intentional abdication of a directorial obligation.225 Mere procedural defects
or directorial inattention do not rise to the level of bad faith
necessary to overcome the business judgment rule, and thus
would not afford courts an opening to police more closely executive compensation.226
The 1930s compensation cases, the stock option cases, and
the Disney decisions all indicate that courts, even Delaware’s
allegedly promanagement courts,227 have at times been willing
to impose or at least threaten higher scrutiny for executive
compensation. By itself, this account could leave the impression
that such higher scrutiny of compensation awards is episodic,
with more rigorous review coming to the fore at moments of
stress in the economic system (e.g., the Great Depression or the
post-Enron period) only to be followed by the return to a deferential stance as public dissatisfaction subsides.
Some evidence, however, suggests otherwise. One of the
authors has conducted an empirical study of cases in which
shareholders challenged compensation pay levels and practices
at public and close corporations.228 The study identified 124 reported cases in the period from 1912 to 2000 in which a “court
decided an issue about the process, size, or composition of an
executive’s pay.”229 It found that in a significant percentage of
those cases, shareholders were successful at some stage of the

224. See Stone ex rel. AmSouth Bancorporation v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362,
369–70 (Del. 2006).
225. Id. at 370; see also Leo E. Strine, Jr. et al., Loyalty’s Core Demand:
The Defining Role of Good Faith in Corporation Law, 98 GEO. L.J. 629, 688–90
(2010) (discussing the course of the Delaware Supreme Court from Disney to
its holding in Stone that one cannot negligently act in bad faith).
226. See Stone, 911 A.2d at 369 (“[O]nly a sustained or systematic failure of
the board to exercise oversight—such as an utter failure to attempt to assure a
reasonable information and reporting system exists—will establish the lack of
good faith that is a necessary condition to liability.” (quoting In re Caremark
Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 971 (Del. Ch. 1996))).
227. The debate over whether Delaware’s courts and corporation law are
more promanagement than other states’ is interminable. See, e.g., Glynn, supra note 219, at 93 (discussing Delaware’s highly deferential approach to corporate decisionmaking).
228. Thomas & Martin, supra note 14, at 571.
229. Id. at 571, 573. For limitations on the study, see id. at 574 –75.
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litigation process.230 To be sure, plaintiffs had lower rates of
success in Delaware’s courts than those of other states,231 and
lower rates of success when challenging compensation at public
corporations as opposed to closely held ones.232 Yet, even plaintiffs in what should have been an unfriendly situation—
challenging compensation at a public corporation in a Delaware
court—enjoyed some measure of success.233
Contrary to the received wisdom, then, courts have not
been uniformly hostile to challenges to executive compensation.
From time to time, courts have applied heightened scrutiny to
either the process or substance of executive compensation decisions, and across the years plaintiffs have enjoyed some success
challenging executive compensation decisions in the courts.
Courts, however, have been reluctant to engage in ongoing
monitoring of executive compensation, voicing the belief (as
they did in the 1930s and 1950s) that they were ill equipped to
set executive compensation or second-guess the considered
judgments of boards of directors.234 They have been hampered,
at least in part, by the waste doctrine and its inherent weaknesses, and by lack of any alternative, practicable approach to
scrutinizing compensation.
In the following Parts we examine a new development in
Delaware jurisprudence, the recognition of officers’ fiduciary
duties, which can empower courts to scrutinize more closely executive compensation decisions without thrusting onto judges
the role of pay setter that they wish to avoid. This approach fits
well with the state’s existing corporate jurisprudence while also
directly addressing the underlying claims of Board Capture
theory.
IV. THE EMERGENCE OF OFFICERS’ FIDUCIARY DUTIES
A new avenue for challenges to executive compensation has
been opened by an important recent development in Delaware
law. In Gantler v. Stephens,235 the Delaware Supreme Court
230. Id. at 571 (defining “success” as a victory at one stage of the litigation
process, such as a motion to dismiss, a motion for summary judgment, trial, or
appeal).
231. Id. at 587.
232. Id. at 601.
233. Id. at 611 (noting that plaintiffs succeeded at some stage of the litigation in twelve out of thirty-five cases).
234. Id. at 601–02.
235. 965 A.2d 695 (Del. 2009).
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held that officers of Delaware corporations owe the same fiduciary duties of care and loyalty to the corporation and its
shareholders as do directors.236 In Gantler, shareholders of a
bank holding company sued several of its directors as well as a
nondirector officer, alleging, among other things, that the defendants violated their fiduciary duties by self-servingly sabotaging an opportunity to sell the company.237 The supreme
court’s decision held, as observers had long presumed, that “the
fiduciary duties of officers are the same as those of directors.”238
While Gantler explicitly answered the question of what officers’ fiduciary duties to the corporation and shareholders
were, it left open at least two other important questions. First,
why had such a vital issue taken so long to come before the
court? Second, what are the contours of officers’ fiduciary duties? As to the first question, the Delaware courts’ neglect was
of a piece with the general neglect of officers’ duties.239 Few
cases over the years in any jurisdiction addressed whether officers owed their corporation fiduciary duties,240 few scholars

236. Id. at 708–09.
237. See id. at 699–703.
238. Id. at 709. The supreme court appeared to be a latecomer to this conclusion. Earlier decisions by the chancery court presumed that officers’ duties
were the same as directors’. See Ryan v. Gifford, 935 A.2d 258, 269 (Del. Ch.
2007); In re Walt Disney Derivative Litig., No. Civ.A. 15452, 2004 WL 2050138,
at *3 & nn.32 & 38 (Del. Ch. Sept. 10, 2004). Scholars, too, had generally assumed this for both Delaware and other jurisdictions. See CLARK, supra note
149, § 45, at 123 (“Statutes and case law say that directors and officers owe
their corporations a duty of care.”); COX & HAZEN, supra note 3, § 10.01, at 184
(the duty of care “can be seen as embracing a standard for officer and director
conduct”); 1 DAVID A. DREXLER ET AL., DELAWARE CORPORATION LAW AND
PRACTICE § 14.02, at 14 -5 (2009) (noting that because officers’ and directors’
duties are the same, “there is no need for a separate discussion of the fiduciary
responsibilities of corporate officers”); Lyman P.Q. Johnson & David Millon,
Recalling Why Corporate Officers Are Fiduciaries, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1597, 1600 & n.10 (2005) (“[C]ourts and commentators routinely describe the
duties of directors and officers together, and in identical terms.”); Sparks &
Hamermesh, supra note 16, at 217 (“Many courts and commentators have taken the position that the rights, duties and liabilities of corporate officers and
directors vis-a-vis the corporation and its stockholders are coextensive.”). The
assumption also appears in the case law of other states. See id. at 217.
239. See Lyman Johnson & Dennis Garvis, Are Corporate Officers Advised
About Fiduciary Duties?, 64 BUS. LAW. 1105, 1106 (2009); Sparks & Hamermesh, supra note 16, at 215.
240. But see Sparks & Hamermesh, supra note 16, at 217 nn.13–17 (citing
cases in which the court ruled that specific officers had fiduciary duties, such
as the president, attorneys, secretaries, vice presidents, and chief executive
officers).
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examined the question,241 and when either spoke on the issue it
was usually to make the cursory statement that “directors and
officers” owed the corporation fiduciary duties.242 Directors’ fiduciary duties received voluminous attention, but officers’ duties did not. It is a strange omission considering that, during
much of the last century, students of the corporation were repeatedly advancing some version of the Board Capture hypothesis and arguing that, even though boards of directors had
legal power to manage the corporation, the CEO usually
wielded the real power.243 Why, then, was not the law of officers’ fiduciary duties being developed by a series of lawsuits
against officers qua officers? Why, if real power was held by officers, were fiduciary duty suits being filed against directors instead?
Scholars have offered a series of explanations for this neglect, including the ability of a board to discipline a negligent or
disloyal officer through contractual means or intracorporate
sanctions, the lack of a comparable mechanism to discipline directors,244 and the fact that directors retained, under the law,
the ultimate power to fire managers.245 We do not disagree with
any of these, but would highlight one other reason why directors’ duties were developed and officers’ were not. Until well into the 1980s, the CEO and other senior officers were usually directors, and many boards were populated largely by inside
director-officers.246 Even though the roles of director and officer
were legally distinct, in practice they were combined in these

241. Although, in recent years there has been an upsurge of studies touching on officers’ fiduciary duties. See, e.g., Z. Jill Barclift, Senior Corporate Officers and the Duty of Candor: Do the CEO and CFO Have a Duty to Inform?,
41 VAL. U. L. REV. 269 (2006); Shannon German, What They Don’t Know Can
Hurt Them: Corporate Officers’ Duty of Candor to Directors, 34 DEL. J. CORP.
L. 221 (2009); Lawrence A. Hamermesh & A. Gilchrist Sparks III, Corporate
Officers and the Business Judgment Rule: A Reply to Professor Johnson, 60
BUS. LAW. 865 (2005); David A. Hoffman, Self-Handicapping and Managers’
Duty of Care, 42 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 803 (2007); Lyman P.Q. Johnson, Corporate Officers and the Business Judgment Rule, 60 BUS. LAW. 439 (2005); Johnson & Garvis, supra note 239; Johnson & Millon, supra note 238; Langevoort,
supra note 16; Usha Rodrigues, From Loyalty to Conflict: Addressing Fiduciary Duty at the Officer Level, 61 FLA. L. REV. 1 (2009); Sale, supra note 199.
242. See MARK A. SARGENT & DENNIS R. HONABACH, D & O LIABILITY
HANDBOOK § I.10, at 45 (2009).
243. See supra Part II.
244. See Johnson & Millon, supra note 238, at 1611–14.
245. See Hoffman, supra note 241, at 808.
246. See Johnson & Millon, supra note 238, at 1612 n.59.
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director-officers.247 A lawsuit against a board for violation of fiduciary duties would thus in almost every instance also sweep
up the firm’s top officers, obviating the need to develop a separate theory of officer liability for violation of fiduciary duties.
The decline of the inside board of directors starting in the
1970s and its supersession by a monitoring board composed
largely of independent directors may have sharpened awareness of the separate roles and distinct duties of senior officers.248 Passage of various corporate reforms during 2002 that
encouraged or mandated more independent directors, most
notably the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, accelerated the trend.249 Delaware’s legislature acknowledged the increased salience of
nondirector officers in 2003 when it amended its law to give the
chancery court new jurisdiction over corporate officers, adding
section 3114(b) to its law to give the court “personal jurisdiction
over officers as such.”250 The official explanation of the new
provision reflected this:
Because of enhanced requirements for independent director representation on public company boards of directors, it is likely that fewer
senior officers will also serve as directors. Therefore, had [s]ection
3114 not been amended, the ability to obtain personal jurisdiction in
Delaware over some of the most significant participants in corporate
governance would have been impaired.251

Ironically, the attempt to decrease officer power by, for example, raising the number of independent directors on boards
and lowering the number of director-officers served to increase
247. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 141–142 (2001).
248. See Johnson & Millon, supra note 238, at 1620–22.
249. Cf. William B. Chandler III & Leo E. Strine, Jr., The New Federalism
of the American Corporate Governance System: Preliminary Reflections of Two
Residents of One Small State, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 953, 1002–03 (2003) (noting
the general effect of such corporate reforms).
250. See Johnson & Millon, supra note 238, at 1612–13 & n.61 (citation
omitted).
251. SARGENT & HONABACH, supra note 242, § I.10, at 48 (quoting Del. Div.
of Corp., General Assembly Approves 2003 Amendments to Corporate Law, ST.
DEL. (June 30, 2003), http://www.state.de.us/corp/2003amends.shtml (discussing the 2003 Delaware law amendments)). Also important in the adoption of
this section was an article by Professors Thompson and Sale, arguing for the
increased importance of officer misconduct. See Chandler & Strine, supra note
249, at 1004 n.125 (“Delaware’s intense focus on director accountability is inadequate to address the important issue of officer misconduct and has ceded
core state law concerns to the federal government, which regulates officer conduct through disclosure regulation, some aspects of which have the intended
effect of encouraging care and loyalty by officers.” (citing Robert B. Thompson
& Hillary A. Sale, Securities Fraud as Corporate Governance: Reflections upon
Federalism, 56 VAND. L. REV. 859, 868–72 (2002))).
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the attention paid to officers’ duties, culminating (for the moment) in Gantler.
Gantler was a case of first impression and left open a number of questions relating to officers’ fiduciary duties. For example, will assertions that officers violated their fiduciary duties
to a corporation and its shareholders be treated identically to a
similar allegation against directors? Are there any differences
between how an officer’s duties will be viewed compared to
those of a director? There clearly will be some differences in
application. Most obviously, an officer accused of violating his
or her duty of care will lack the ironclad protection offered directors by the exculpatory provision of DGCL section
102(b)(7),252 though we expect that officers will be able to invoke some of the protective rules now available to directors,
notably the business judgment rule, when their decisions are
challenged.253 For purposes of this Article, however, we need
not address all these questions. Gantler has answered the essential question concerning officers’ duties. As we shall show
below, the chancery court earlier had suggested how an officer’s
fiduciary duties should be applied in one important situation—
when the officer is negotiating with the board for an employment contract.
V. OFFICERS’ FIDUCIARY DUTIES AND EXECUTIVE
COMPENSATION CONTRACTS
Gantler held that officers have “fiduciary duties of care and
loyalty . . . [which] are the same as those of directors.”254 In so
doing, it—perhaps unexpectedly—opened the door for the chan252. See Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695, 709 n.37 (Del. 2009). This assumes that Delaware’s legislature will not amend section 102(b)(7) to shield
officers as well, something that may very well occur. See Michael Follett, Note,
Gantler v. Stephens: Big Epiphany or Big Failure?, 35 DEL. J. CORP. L. 563,
576–77 (2010) (discussing application of section 102(b)(7) to officers).
253. See Gantler v. Stephens, No. 2392-VCP, 2008 WL 401124, at *8 (Del.
Ch. Feb. 14, 2008), rev’d on other grounds, 965 A.2d 695 (holding that officers
and directors are protected by the business judgment rule). But see Johnson,
supra note 241, at 469 (arguing against automatic application of the business
judgment rule to officers’ decisions).
254. Gantler, 965 A.2d at 709; see also id. at 709 n.37 (noting the absence of
section 102(b)(7) protections for officers). We note that the court’s holding that
officers’ and directors’ duties are “identical” appears to reject earlier proposals
that “the fiduciary duties and liability rules for officers . . . be analyzed separately from those for outside directors,” and that officers instead be found to be
bound by a stronger set of fiduciary duties derived from agency law. Johnson
& Millon, supra note 238, at 1604.
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cery court to vigorously police executive compensation by allowing its judges to ask whether officers upheld their fiduciary duties when negotiating their compensation agreements. Indeed,
the chancery court had already begun to develop such an approach.
Chancellor Chandler and Vice Chancellor Noble laid the
basis for a new judicial approach to executive compensation in
two important opinions that predated Gantler: (1) the 2003
Disney decision, which denied the defendant’s summary judgment motion,255 and (2) Elkins, a 2004 case in which shareholder-plaintiffs alleged, among other things, that a CEO violated
his duty of loyalty when negotiating his compensation agreements with his corporation.256 Read together, Disney and Elkins point toward a new way for courts to police excessive executive compensation, one that asks courts to scrutinize the
processes by which an officer negotiated her compensation
package.257 The compensation package will be upheld if the officer did not, in the course of negotiating the pay package,
breach her fiduciary duties.258
Under this approach, a preliminary step is to determine
whether the individual negotiating the employment agreement
is an officer of the company, or merely a prospective one. In
both decisions, the Chancellor and Vice Chancellor differentiate
between negotiations of initial employment contracts and subsequent employment contracts. In initial employment contracts, where a candidate has been offered a position as an executive at a company, but has not yet accepted, the candidate
does not have a fiduciary obligation to the company.259 Therefore, when the candidate is negotiating his or her initial employment contract with the company, he or she is free to bargain to obtain the most lucrative terms possible.260 For
example, in Disney one of the plaintiffs’ allegations was that
Michael Ovitz took advantage of his relationship with Disney
CEO Michael Eisner to get himself an extremely favorable ini-

255. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 825 A.2d 275, 290 (Del. Ch.
2003).
256. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Integrated Health Servs.,
Inc. v. Elkins, No. Civ.A. 20228-NC, 2004 WL 1949290, at *16 (Del. Ch. Aug.
24, 2004).
257. See id. (citing Disney, 825 A.2d at 290).
258. See id. (citing Disney, 825 A.2d at 290).
259. Id.; Disney, 825 A.2d at 290.
260. Elkins, 2004 WL 1949290, at *16; Disney, 825 A.2d at 290.
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tial employment agreement.261 As the Chancellor noted, Ovitz
was not a fiduciary of the company at the time that he negotiated this contract, and therefore the court would not apply
any type of exacting judicial scrutiny to those negotiations.262
Once an executive enters into a firm’s employment and becomes an officer of the company, however, things change.263 She
acquires fiduciary obligations to both the company and its
shareholders.264 These obligations prohibit her from using all
the tools at her disposal to wring the most favorable compensation package possible from the company.265 As the Chancellor
and Vice Chancellor make clear in Disney and Elkins, her fiduciary obligations thereafter require her to negotiate any subsequent compensation agreement in a manner that is fair to the
company from a procedural perspective—she must negotiate
“in an adversarial and arm’s-length manner.”266 In this potentially self-dealing transaction, the officer may not use tactics
that would be unfair to the company.267 For example, as the
plaintiffs alleged in Disney, an officer negotiating a subsequent
compensation agreement would be violating her fiduciary duties if she used the fact that she was a friend of the CEO, or
secretary of the compensation committee, to receive special
treatment.268
Within these broad parameters, there lurk a number of
significant interpretive issues. For instance, what does it mean
to say that a contract has been negotiated in an adversarial
and arm’s-length manner? One would think that such negotiations would be similar to those engaged in by two individuals
who had no preexisting relationship. Thus, the prototypical ne261. Disney, 825 A.2d at 290.
262. Id.
263. See id. (noting that an officer does not owe fiduciary duties before becoming an officer).
264. Id.
265. Id.
266. Id. That the contract be equivalent to what would be reached in arm’slength negotiations may be a little much to ask, for this seems to be demanding that the contract be “perfect” in a way not possible in a world with transaction costs, and where some managers will inevitably wield some power in some
negotiations. See Core et al., supra note 6, at 1161–63. For purposes of this Article, though, we recognize that the court is demanding, at minimum, that a
negotiation process occur that is not deformed by illegitimate use of executive
power and in which the parties attempt in good faith to replicate the agreement that an arm’s-length, adversarial negotiation would produce.
267. See Disney, 825 A.2d at 290.
268. See id.
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gotiation for a subsequent executive employment contract (i.e.,
a negotiation between the officer-fiduciary and the corporation)
might look something like this: the executive, either on her behalf or represented by counsel, negotiates with a fully informed
and vigorous chair or legal counsel of the compensation committee,269 where the company’s negotiator had no prior economic relationship or other disabling conflict of interest with the
executive. One hallmark of arm’s-length negotiations might be
for the compensation committee to treat the negotiations with
the CEO like those they engage in with lower-ranked officers of
the company. For example, the committee might ask if the CEO
has an offer, or the ability to get an offer, to leave the company
for another position, or they might consider the level of compensation increases requested by the CEO in light of the increases granted to other officers at the firm. We might also expect the compensation committee to retain a respected
negotiating agent whose task is to drive the best bargain possible for the company and who is not dependent on management
for retention or compensation level.
As part of her fiduciary duties, the officer would also have
an obligation to ensure that all material information concerning the agreement was disclosed to the board of directors before
the execution of the contract.270 For example, the officer would
need to make sure that the compensation committee was fully
informed as to any business dealings that the executive had
with the primary negotiator for the company or any other types
of information that would indicate that the negotiation process
had been undermined.271 In addition, the members of the compensation committee or the board itself would need to have the
269. The Chairman would need information about the prevailing market
levels of compensation for similarly situated executives at comparable firms.
This could require the compensation committee to retain a compensation consultant that did not have any conflicts of interest. Given the soon-to-be effective SEC rules mandating that companies disclose to their shareholders all
work that their compensation consultants perform for the firm and what fees
they receive for it, many public companies are already moving toward using
specialized consultants for their executive compensation information. See
Joann S. Lublin, Boards Turn to Smaller Pay Advisors to Avoid Conflicts,
WALL ST. J., Jan. 11, 2010, at B7.
270. Such a disclosure could also be dictated by the officer’s duty to disclose
to the board matters calling for board oversight. See Sparks & Hamermesh,
supra note 16, at 226.
271. Cf. Disney, 825 A.2d at 290 (noting that Ovitz and Eisner had a duty
of good faith to negotiate with a compensation committee or at least keep the
committee informed of their negotiations).
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opportunity to examine the negotiation process and to question
the terms of any contract that was negotiated.272 During such a
process, board members would need to have the opportunity to
object to certain aspects of the negotiation or to provisions
within the proposed employment contract.273
In Elkins, Vice Chancellor Noble gave some examples of
the type of allegations that a plaintiff would need to make in
order to successfully establish a prima facie case that an officer
had breached his fiduciary duties in negotiating a subsequent
employment contract.274 There, Elkins, the CEO of a company,
was heavily involved in both the compensation committee
meetings and board meetings at which his contract was approved.275 The plaintiffs alleged that Elkins had provided agendas for these meetings, attended them, spoken with directors
about his compensation outside of the meetings, negotiated his
compensation packages with the board and the compensation
committee, and spoken with the board’s compensation consultant.276 The complaint further alleged that Elkins had reviewed
the compensation consultant’s reports before they were submitted to the board, had exerted pressure on the compensation
consultant to justify Elkins’s compensation, and had personally
stated several inaccurate facts to the board.277 Vice Chancellor
Noble wrote that, while these allegations were not sufficient by
themselves individually to show a breach of the duty of loyalty,
together they suggested that Elkins might have engaged in a
self-interested transaction.278
The Elkins decision suggests something else as well. While
Gantler established that corporate officers have fiduciary duties identical to those of directors, not all corporate officers will
have the opportunity to undermine their compensation negotiations. Thus, while the requirements for fair compensation nego272. Cf. id. at 291 (noting that Ovitz did not go to the Disney board and inform it of his decision to seek a departure, but instead negotiated with Eisner
to develop a strategy that would allow Ovitz to receive the maximum benefit
possible from his contract).
273. Cf. id. at 290 (remarking that the employment agreement between
Eisner and Ovitz differed significantly from the draft summarized to the compensation committee).
274. See Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Integrated Health
Servs., Inc. v. Elkins, No. Civ.A. 20228-NC, 2004 WL 1949290, at *16 (Del. Ch.
Aug. 24, 2004).
275. Id.
276. Id.
277. Id.
278. Id.
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tiations set out in Disney and Elkins will apply to all officers,
they will be particularly important for those top officers who
will have the greatest opportunity and power to corrupt the negotiations process, most notably the CEO. Indeed, it would be
the rare situation in which an officer other than the CEO was
able to capture the negotiation process for her own employment
agreement.
If it came to litigation, the shareholder-plaintiffs would be
filing a derivative suit against the officers on behalf of the corporation and would need to satisfy the demand requirement.279
This would not be all to the bad; the demand requirement functions to filter out meritless suits, and we expect that it would
similarly function here to deter “strike suits” challenging most
executive compensation decisions, while allowing challenges to
proceed in egregious instances where a board was so remiss in
its duties that it allowed an officer to subvert the compensation
negotiation process. Under Delaware law, to avoid having the
board take control of the litigation, the plaintiffs must raise a
reasonable doubt either that the directors were not disinterested or independent or that the decision was not the product of
a valid exercise of business judgment.280 Of course, if the plaintiffs were able to raise a reasonable doubt about the directors’
disinterest or independence, by for instance pleading facts
tending to show that the directors were beholden to and under
the domination of the officer in question, then demand would
be excused.281 But this, we think, usually will not be the case.
In many instances, shareholders will not be claiming that the
board is beholden to the CEO or other officer receiving the
compensation,282 only that the board effectively ceded to the officer the power to set his compensation by allowing that officer
to capture the compensation process. More typically, the claim
will assert that demand is excused because the board so ne279. See COX & HAZEN, supra note 3, § 15.05, at 428–29.
280. See Levine v. Smith, 591 A.2d 194, 207 (Del. 1991); Aronson v. Lewis,
473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984).
281. Levine, 591 A.2d at 205 (“When lack of independence is charged, a
plaintiff must show that the Board is either dominated by an officer or director
who is the proponent of the challenged transaction or that the Board is so under his influence that its discretion is sterilized.” (citation omitted)).
282. Because criticism tends to focus on CEO compensation, and because
CEOs are in a particularly good position to manipulate compensation negotiations, we expect most suits of the kind we sketch out here to be against CEOs.
But the legal theories we discuss here would also allow suits against other officers similarly able to manipulate compensation negotiations.
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glected or mishandled the compensation negotiations that its
decision was not the product of a valid business judgment.
We expect that most suits targeting officers for excessive
compensation will include two distinct claims. The first claim
would be that the board acted with gross negligence in allowing
the CEO to capture and undermine the compensation negotiation process; this claim is necessary to have demand excused.283
The second claim would be that the officer violated her duty of
loyalty in undermining and manipulating the process; this
claim would be at the heart of the suit. Subsequently, the directors may be able to escape liability for gross negligence if their
corporation’s charter includes a section 102(b)(7) exculpatory
clause, but this clause will not change the fact that demand
was excused and will not prevent the main claim against the
officer for breach of duty of loyalty from proceeding.284
This may seem an unusual way to construct a claim, but in
a remarkably instructive case, the Chancellor has already
shown how it could be done. Like the hypothetical case
sketched out above, McPadden v. Sidhu285 involved allegations
that a board of directors was grossly negligent in allowing a
corporate officer to manipulate a process to his economic advantage.286 In McPadden, the board of i2 Technologies wished
to sell a recently acquired subsidiary.287 To run the sale, it
chose the subsidiary’s vice president, who was himself interested in purchasing the subsidiary.288 According to the complaint,
the officer then arranged an auction which excluded other serious bidders and allowed the officer and his allies to purchase
the subsidiary for a sum well below what it was worth.289 The
shareholder-plaintiffs subsequently filed a derivative suit
against both the directors and the officer, alleging that they

283. See Aronson, 473 A.2d at 804. The claim will not merely be that the
board acted with imperfect information, for this would not necessarily constitute gross negligence. See Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 259 (Del. 2000). We
expect that the totality of the circumstances will have to show gross negligence, and withheld information will be only one element of that claim.
284. See Guttman v. Huang, 823 A.2d 492, 501 (Del. Ch. 2003). Under Delaware law, the board could still create a special committee of independent directors that could retake control of the litigation. See Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 785 (Del. 1981).
285. 964 A.2d 1262 (Del. Ch. 2008).
286. Id. at 1264.
287. Id. at 1263.
288. Id.
289. Id. at 1264 –65.
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acted in bad faith. Defendants responded by claiming that demand was not excused.290
Plaintiffs asserted that demand was excused because the
i2s board’s “approval of the sale was not fully informed, not duly considered, and not made in good faith for the benefit of the
Company,” and so was not entitled to the protection of the
business judgment rule.291 Chancellor Chandler rejected the
assertion that the board acted in bad faith, with its implication
that the board violated its duty of loyalty.292 He agreed with
plaintiffs, however, that they had sufficiently pleaded facts
showing that the board had acted with gross negligence in the
sale, thereby violating its duty of care.293 The Chancellor found
that, even though i2’s board had expert advice on the sale, its
refusal to consider reasonably available information and its decision to task a self-interested officer with running the sale
created a reasonable doubt that its actions were the product of
valid business judgment, and so demand was excused.294 However, the company’s charter included a section 102(b)(7) exculpation clause, so Chancellor Chandler dismissed the duty of
care claims against the directors for failure to state a claim.295
Had the suit only been against the directors that would
have been the end of it. But plaintiffs in McPadden had also
sued the officer for, among other items, violating his duty of
loyalty.296 Section 102(b)(7) serves to protect directors, but not
officers, against claims of duty of loyalty violations, so it did not
extinguish the plaintiffs’ claim against the officer.297 Furthermore, as the Chancellor pointed out, he had “already concluded
that demand is excused as futile, meaning that plaintiff has the
right to prosecute this litigation on behalf of the Company.”298
While the case could not go ahead against the directors, “the
claim [against the officer] for breach of fiduciary duty may,
without a doubt, proceed.”299

290.
291.
292.
293.
294.
295.
296.
297.
298.
299.

Id. at 1264.
Id. at 1270.
Id. at 1274 –75.
Id.
Id. at 1271.
Id. at 1275.
Id. at 1275–76.
Id. at 1275.
Id.
Id.
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As should be clear, we expect that McPadden could serve
as a template for shareholder lawsuits alleging that officers
have breached their fiduciary duties in negotiating compensation agreements. Like the cases we foresee, McPadden involved
allegations of a negligent board, a self-interested officer, and a
negotiation process that the officer was allowed thoroughly to
corrupt through board inattention.300 The analogy to executive
officer employment contracts seems quite compelling to us.301
While Chancellor Chandler noted the “perhaps unusual circumstances” of McPadden,302 our approach can be successful
with only a few such cases. In fact, we anticipate that only outlier compensation arrangements will stimulate litigation.
Neither the Elkins and Disney decisions nor McPadden
spell out all the steps that a shareholder would need to take to
enforce officers’ fiduciary duties through litigation. We can,
though, delineate some steps that a court would have to follow
in litigation where a plaintiff alleges that an officer violated his
fiduciary duties in extracting excess compensation from a company (assuming plaintiffs succeed in having demand excused).
As explained above, when an officer begins negotiations for a
subsequent employment contract, he would have a duty to negotiate his contract in an arm’s-length and adversarial manner.
Should a shareholder-plaintiff complain that those negotiations
were flawed and offer sufficient factual allegations to create a
reasonable doubt that this was the case, as in Elkins, then the
officer would have the burden of demonstrating that the negotiations were arm’s length and adversarial. Should the officer
fail to carry this burden, a court would find that he breached
his fiduciary duties by manipulating the negotiation and ap300. Id. at 1264 –68.
301. For example, in McPadden, the Chancellor took the board to task for
placing the executive in charge of selling a division of the company that it
knew the executive was also interested in purchasing. Id. at 1271. In an executive employment contract negotiation, allowing the executive to control the
process of negotiating her own contract and compensation would seem to be a
similarly invalid exercise of the board’s business judgment.
302. Id. We note that the plaintiffs in McPadden used a section 220 books
and records demand to gather the necessary information to investigate the
underlying circumstances surrounding the transaction prior to filing their derivative suit. As one of us has previously written, section 220 is an excellent, if
costly, method for obtaining the discovery needed to particularize the allegations in a derivative suit. See Randall S. Thomas, Improving Shareholder
Monitoring of Corporate Management by Expanding Statutory Access to Information, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 331, 359 (1996). We envision it being used routinely by plaintiffs in the cases we are concerned with in this Article.
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proval process. If the officer “manipulated the process, he cannot benefit from the decisions reached through that process.”303
Thus, neither compensation committee nor board approval will
cleanse the breach of fiduciary duties that occurred.
This leaves several unanswered questions. First, assuming
that full disclosure was subsequently made of all the relevant
facts, would a majority of the disinterested shareholders then
be able to approve the officer’s breach of fiduciary duties?304
While until now the procedures provided for conflict-of-interest
transactions in DGCL section 144 have been used to cleanse directors’ conflicted transactions, the section speaks of “a contract
or transaction between a corporation and [one] or more of its
directors or officers.”305 It should apply in the employment contract context; however, for approval to be valid, shareholders
would have to be told of the “material facts” relating to the “relationship or interest and as to the contract or transaction.”306
In other words, shareholders would have to be told that the officer had manipulated the process in order to be fully informed
in their voting.307 Having to provide this information to shareholders would presumably help to keep the board on its toes. It
would also give boards strong incentives to provide a form of
say-on-pay for shareholders in situations where there might be
reason to doubt the legitimacy of the underlying contract itself.
Second, assuming a court determined that an officer did
breach his or her duties while negotiating a subsequent employment contract, what would be the next step? In a comparable situation, where a director breached his fiduciary duties in
a conflict-of-interest situation, the burden would be placed on
that director to demonstrate the entire fairness of the transaction, meaning the director would have to show both fair dealing
and fair price.308 By analogy, an officer would have to make the
same showing. This suggests that a reviewing court would re303. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Integrated Health Servs.,
Inc. v. Elkins, No. Civ.A. 20228-NC, 2004 WL 1949290, at *17 (Del. Ch. Aug.
24, 2004).
304. Disinterested director approval would presumably not be possible because the underlying claim in the case would be that the board was uninformed about the various manipulative actions committed by the CEO as part
of the negotiation process. Vice Chancellor Noble reached just this conclusion
in Elkins. See id. at 9–19.
305. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144(a) (2001).
306. Id. § 144(a)(2).
307. Id.
308. See, e.g., Weinberger v. UOP, 457 A.2d 701, 711 (Del. 1983).
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quire the officer to demonstrate both that the contract was a
product of fair dealing and that the corporation was paying a
fair price for the officer’s services.309 However, in the first step
of the court’s analysis, it has already concluded that the contract was negotiated in an unfair manner to the corporation.
Does this mean that the officer is unable to demonstrate entire
fairness in any circumstances, since fair dealing is lost? Or does
it simply place a higher burden upon the officer to show that
the contract was fairly priced for the services that the corporation received? Third, if the court determined that the transaction (i.e., the compensation agreement) was not entirely fair,
what would the consequences be for the directors and the officer? For most director-defendants, the consequences would
probably not be significant. Assuming that the directors did not
consciously collude in providing the officer excessive compensation, the most damaging claim against them would be that they
acted carelessly, and even where it found that they had acted
with gross negligence, monetary damages against them would
almost certainly be extinguished by a section 102(b)(7) charter
provision.310 For the officer, though, the consequences would be
more dire. Having found that the officer violated his duty of
loyalty to the corporation, a court could order restitution and
require that the officer return to the corporation any sum
beyond which he would have received in a fair agreement.311
Alternatively, the court could order rescission of the agreement
and require the officer to disgorge all compensation received
from the flawed compensation agreement.312 Some courts would
likely shy away from such a harsh result, but others might well
welcome such a consequence for its salutary in terrorem effect.

309. A fair price determination, if needed, could require the Court to compare the compensation paid to that at comparable companies, and determine if
the amount was such an outlier in relation to what other firms paid that it
was unfair to the company. This procedure could be adopted from the method
employed by courts in tax cases for close corporations where they are required
to determine if the compensation payments are reasonable. See Vagts, supra
note 74, at 257–61.
310. See In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 825 A.2d 275, 286 (Del.
Ch. 2003).
311. See Langevoort, supra note 16, at 1205 (noting the availability of civil
damages for breach of duty of candor); Yablon, supra note 154, at 1901 (suggesting that damages from a similar suit, where courts had adopted a proportionality test to measure executive compensation, would be moderate).
312. Langevoort, supra note 16, at 1205–06 & n.78 (citing RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF AGENCY § 469 (1954)).

2011]

EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION

895

The very possibility of such litigation, even in a small
number of situations, will, we expect, serve to discipline compensation negotiations even at firms whose shareholders never
resort to the courts. First, such occasional lawsuits that do
make their way through the courts will give Delaware judges
the opportunity to develop and promulgate a set of best practices to be followed in negotiating these compensation agreements, much as during the 1980s and 1990s they developed
special procedures for boards to follow when selling companies
to managers or controlling shareholders (transactions similarly
rife with possible self-dealing).313 While improved procedures
will help to ensure that the board is better informed, we think
that the possibility of such suits will also affect the advice given
to executives and boards about these agreements and their negotiation. As Charles Yablon has noted, “[m]ost legal regulation
of corporate behavior does not take place in court, but in lawyers’ offices, as corporate lawyers counsel their clients as to
what they must do to avoid legal ‘problems’ in connection with
the actions they want to take.”314 The threat, however remote,
of the kind of lawsuit sketched out here could provide significant incentives for CEOs to ensure that their compensation
agreements were negotiated in an arm’s-length and adversarial
manner, and more generally to avoid overreaching in such negotiations.315
The advantages to this approach, in light of both history
and theory, should be clear. As the above historical account
shows, courts have at times been willing to inquire into allegedly excessive executive compensation.316 The approach advocated
here asks courts to evaluate the negotiation process used in
reaching a compensation agreement, and evaluating process is
something in which Delaware’s judges are particularly skilled,
and only if there are significant defects, would they need to address the reasonableness of pay levels. It also addresses a central concern of the Board Capture theorists. While Board Capture theorists may speak of a captive board, their particular
claim is that executives have captured the process by which ex313. See Jeffrey N. Gordon, Executive Compensation: If There’s a Problem,
What’s the Remedy? The Case for “Compensation Discussion and Analysis,” 30
J. CORP. L. 675, 689–90 (2005) (noting Delaware courts’ “special judicial vigilance” over such self-interested transactions and pointing out the courts’ comparative lack of vigilance over executive compensation).
314. Yablon, supra note 154, at 1897.
315. See id. at 1897–900.
316. See supra Part II.
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ecutive compensation is set.317 The approach set out here calls
for courts to scrutinize closely that process.318

317. See BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 9, at 32–44 (discussing the paysetting processes and analyzing whether boards are indeed bargaining at
arm’s length).
318. Some will see similarities between our approach and Congress’s approach regarding mutual fund advisory fees. In 1970, concerned about high
advisory fees, Congress added section 36(b) to the Investment Company Act,
imposing a fiduciary duty on investment advisors regarding compensation
they receive from investment companies, and giving shareholders a private
right of action to enforce this duty. See Investment Company Amendments Act
of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-547, § 20, 84 Stat. 1413, 1428–30 (1970) (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35 (2006)). Section 36(b) has, however, proven
toothless; despite numerous suits, no mutual fund shareholder has ever won a
case under it. See William A. Birdthistle, Investment Indiscipline: A Behavioral Approach to Mutual Fund Jurisprudence, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 61, 88. Will
our approach work any better? We think so, for several reasons. Most important, courts applying section 36(b) have developed a remarkably narrow approach to evaluating claims of excessive fees (i.e., fees violating the advisor’s
fiduciary duty). Courts evaluating such claims typically invoke a multifactor
test first set out in Gartenberg v. Merrill Lynch Asset Mgmt., Inc., whose factors include rates charged by other advisors and the “nature and quality of the
service” provided. 694 F.2d 923, 927–30 (2d. Cir. 1982); see also Jones v. Harris Assocs. L.P., 130 S. Ct. 1418, 1410–21 (2010) (commending the Gartenberg
factors in evaluating claims under section 36(b)). According to Gartenberg,
however, the point of the test is to determine whether the fee was “so disproportionately large that it bears no reasonable relationship to the services rendered and could not have been the product of arm’s-length bargaining.” Gartenberg, 694 F.2d at 928 (citation omitted). In other words, this approach first
asks a court to evaluate the substance of compensation—a task that, we have
shown, courts dislike—but then tells the court that an advisor’s compensation
violates its fiduciary duty only if it verges on waste—a standard almost impossible to meet. See Donald C. Langevoort, Private Litigation to Enforce Fiduciary Duties in Mutual Funds: Derivative Suits, Disinterested Directors and
the Ideology of Investor Sovereignty, 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 1017, 1023 (2005). Little
wonder that courts consistently reject section 36(b) claims. Our approach, as
should be clear, is quite different. It does not ask the chancery court to weigh
the substance of an executive compensation decision; instead, the court is to
make the more familiar inquiry whether process, in this case the negotiation
of an executive’s compensation agreement, was proper. Nor is “waste” a part of
the evaluation. Courts’ willingness to find for plaintiffs under these two approaches may also differ. While a federal court may now be unlikely to find for
a shareholder making a section 36(b) claim, simply because such claims have
always lost in the past, Delaware courts are not similarly hobbled in challenges to executive compensation. Plaintiffs usually lose such claims, but some
have enjoyed some success in litigation challenging executive compensation,
demonstrating that the courts are not completely unwilling to entertain such
claims. Thomas & Martin, supra note 14, at 571. In sum, while our approach
shares superficial resemblances to the approach mandated by section 36(b), in
substance the approaches are quite different and will, we believe, result in different outcomes.
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The innovative analysis pioneered in Disney and Elkins
should be more broadly adopted by the Delaware courts. In addition to providing much-needed substance to the concept of officers’ fiduciary duties in the executive compensation setting, it
also addresses one of the major criticisms of executive (particularly CEO) compensation practices in public corporations: that
many executive compensation agreements are products of
sweetheart deals and that the terms of these deals are influenced by the personal relationships senior managers have
among themselves and with the board of directors.319 As it further articulates and applies this approach, the chancery court
will be developing clearer boundaries between permissible and
impermissible forms of negotiations.
VI. THEORETICAL RESPONSES
We believe the approach set out above can curb overreaching in abusive executive compensation agreements in practice,
but will it work in theory? Can it respond to the distinctive concerns of Board Capture theorists, and, if so, will it also be acceptable to advocates of that theory’s main rival, Optimal Contracting? We believe our approach will be acceptable to both
camps. Indeed, one of the advantages of the approach set out
here is that it may reconcile these apparently irreconcilable
theoretical approaches. Board Capture theorists will welcome
renewed scrutiny of the seemingly incestuous relationships
among officers and directors, while Optimal Contracting theorists will see it as an improvement to the contracting environment and a remedy for those rare instances where officers have
extracted unmerited compensation from their employers.
First, if our approach is adopted by the courts, it will answer many of the criticisms leveled by Board Capture theory’s
advocates against existing processes for negotiating executive
employment contracts and setting compensation levels. When a
corporate insider becomes a CEO, presumably benefiting from
an allegedly cozy relationship with corporate directors,320
courts will look more closely at her employment contract be319. Cf. BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 9, at 31–34 (discussing the social
and psychological factors that “encourage directors to go along with compensation arrangements that favor the company’s CEO”).
320. Lower-level corporate officers often have the advantage of sitting on
the board, or at least interacting with the directors prior to their selection as
CEO, and therefore developing relationships with other directors before being
nominated to the top job.
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cause she was a fiduciary at the corporation prior to becoming
CEO. By comparison, outsiders have no previous employment
relationship with the firm and therefore cannot have developed
similar relationships with board members. As a result, courts
will not apply officer fiduciary doctrines to these contract negotiations. Thus, Board Capture theorists would welcome our approach as it focuses attention on the employment contracts they
believe are most likely to be tainted.
More broadly, Board Capture theory is concerned that executives have overly cozy ties to the directors of their firms and
that those directors will be overly generous to, or even in the
back pockets of, the executives.321 Our approach should lead to
disclosure of any such relationships. Stricter standards for disclosure of any connections between board members and executives or of undue influence by executives on compensation consultants or compensation committee members should help cast
sunlight on any behind-the-scenes deals. If the negotiations are
sufficiently tainted, our approach will also lead to the compensation arrangements being overturned and potential damage
remedies against the officer responsible. Such judicial action
should warm the hearts of Board Capture theorists as it will
address their complaint of close relationships between board
members and firm officers.322
So far we have focused on Board Capture theory and argued that under this theory stricter judicial scrutiny is viewed
as beneficial. Would that also be true under Optimal Contracting theory? Optimal Contracting theory claims that top officers’
employment contracts are designed to maximize shareholder
value net of contracting costs and transactions costs.323 This
does not mean that these executives’ contracts look like contracts negotiated between two parties of equal negotiating
strength in an arm’s-length transaction,324 for such contractual
perfection seems unattainable. Instead, Optimal Contracting
theory observes that in our current corporate governance system, managers do have a strong influence over the nomination
of directors and it thus postulates that observed contracts anticipate and try to minimize the costs of this power.325 While
321. See, e.g., BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 9, at 31–34.
322. Cf. id. at 94 (commenting on the relationships and degree of influence
between board members and CEOs).
323. Core et al., supra note 6, at 1160.
324. Id. at 1163–64.
325. Id. at 1160–64.

2011]

EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION

899

contract structures reflect executives’ power, and executives
with more power get more pay, an optimal contract “maximizes
the net expected economic value to shareholders after transactions costs (e.g., contracting costs) and payments to employees”
so that it minimizes agency costs.326 In other words, an optimal
contract is not perfect, but rather is the best contract that can
be achieved to maximize shareholder value given the contracting costs in a particular corporate governance setting.327
Optimal Contracting theory accepts that American boards
of directors are not completely independent.328 While we could
design a corporate governance system where a corporate board
is almost completely independent of the CEO (leaving aside
such imperfections as the fact that internally promoted CEOs
will know the board members and even externally hired CEOs
are likely to know at least some of the board members), this
may not be optimal. For one thing, a corporate board has many
other responsibilities besides contracting with executives about
compensation, and to best fulfill these responsibilities may necessitate a nonindependent board. A board that is optimized for
making compensation decisions could destroy value by making
bad decisions on operational performance. Thus, the board
structure that maximizes overall share value may not be comprised entirely of independent directors.329 Under Optimal Contracting theory, the optimal compensation contract with the executive is not the one that results from the arm’s-length
bargaining of an independent board; it is the one that maximizes net shareholder value given that the board is optimized to
perform several functions.
Optimal Contracting theorists claim that current U.S. corporate governance is likely to be “extremely good given the existence of information costs, transactions costs, and the existing
U.S. legal and regulatory system.”330 This, in turn, leads to the
conclusion that executive compensation agreements negotiated
by corporate boards will be good, taking into account the fea326. John E. Core et al., Executive Equity Compensation and Incentives: A
Survey, 9 ECON. POL’Y R. 27, 27 (2003).
327. See Core et al., supra note 6, at 1160.
328. See id. at 1162.
329. See id. at 1162–63.
330. Id. at 1161. Conceivably, improved regulation or other changes to the
contracting environment could lower contracting costs and improve overall governance by, for example, making boards more independent and effective monitors, without impairing their ability to assist the corporation’s officers in their
operational functions.
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tures of our corporate governance system.331 Thus, when a new
top officer is hired, optimal contracts are expected to be structured ex ante to take into consideration that the executive will
ex post build managerial power over time.332 Such contracts
will ensure that the officer does not earn excess pay.333 Simply
showing at a given point in time that a manager has power
says little about whether a firm has contracted optimally with
the manager, or whether the manager earns excess pay in expectation over his or her tenure as manager. The important
question is whether it leads to bad outcomes for shareholders.
Litigation is part of the background corporate governance
system that underlies all negotiations between boards and top
executives. Optimal Contracting theory claims that boards contract optimally given the corporate governance system’s allocation of power between directors and officers.334 If we strengthen
the directors’ position in contract negotiations, then that should
affect the initial power of the two parties to the negotiations.
The parties will then contract based on the new allocation of
power.
Moreover, even Optimal Contracting theorists agree that
there are a few bad apples.335 Our proposal is tightly focused on
the outliers in the compensation process, the instances where
we find contracts that are far from the average in terms of their
contract features or pay levels. When these type of contracts
arise because of breaches of fiduciary duty, and not because of
economic factors that might otherwise justify their existence,
they would be suspect under our proposal. If courts can inexpensively and successfully identify and remedy cases where insiders have abused their positions to obtain excessive compensation packages, then they will also be remedying defects in the
corporate governance system.

331. See id.
332. See id. at 1164.
333. See id. If the CEO already has power at the time of his initial employment, he will earn pay greater than he could with arm’s-length bargaining. An optimal contract will take into account the fact that the initial contract
will typically have a limited life of three or five years and seek to limit this
power. See Stewart J. Schwab & Randall S. Thomas, An Empirical Analysis of
CEO Employment Contracts: What Do Top Executives Bargain For?, 63 WASH.
& LEE L. REV. 231, 235 (2006) (the most common lengths for CEO employment
contracts are three and five years).
334. See Core et al., supra note 6, at 1161.
335. See id. at 1143–44.
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This, in turn, should improve the underlying contracting
environment that forms the backdrop for Optimal Contracting
theory and therefore reduce contracting costs.336 More generally, when the legal system successfully addresses a problem in
the corporate governance system, the contracting environment
becomes more efficient and shareholder wealth should increase.337 The proposal set out in this Article should thus be
welcomed by Optimal Contracting as well as Board Capture
theorists.
CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
This Article identifies a theoretical impasse in our understanding of executive compensation and looks to recent developments in corporation law to find a practicable way out. At
present, debates over executive compensation are waged between two scholarly camps. Advocates of Board Capture theory
claim that boards of directors are dominated by corporations’
CEOs and that those CEOs are able to set their own compensation, leading CEOs and other senior officers to take home pay
packages that are both too high and provide too few incentives
for improved corporate performance. Optimal Contracting
theorists disagree. While admitting that a few compensation
packages are inequitable, these theorists contend that, given
the constraints of the current legal and regulatory system, most
current CEO compensation agreements should be pretty good.
They reward CEOs appropriately and, equally important, provide for increased shareholder value. Despite vigorous scholarly
debate, however, little progress has been made in the theory of,
and little has been done in practice to curb, excessive compensation packages.
A new avenue has been opened up by recent developments
in corporation law that brings to life a neglected area: officers’
fiduciary duties. In the Gantler decision, Delaware’s supreme
court recognized that corporate officers have the same fiduciary
duties as do directors, and in two recent decisions its chancery
court set out a road map showing how courts can review executive compensation agreements by scrutinizing the ways in
which they were negotiated. While agreements between top executives and their corporations may never be truly at arm’s
length or adversarial, these two decisions describe what would
336. Id. at 1161–62.
337. See id. at 1162.
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be necessary in such negotiations for a court to conclude that
an agreement was not the product of an executive’s power over
the board of directors.
Critics of executive compensation have generally dismissed
courts as effective monitors of executive pay. As we have
shown, such a sweeping judgment is wrong. In several past episodes courts have been unsettled by high executive compensation and willing to scrutinize large pay packages. What courts
have been consistently unwilling to do is to become pay czars.
Our approach, focusing as it does on outlier pay arrangements
and the process by which such compensation agreements are
negotiated, should be welcomed by courts.
From a theoretical perspective, our approach should cheer
both Board Capture and Optimal Contracting theorists. For
Board Capture theorists, the Delaware courts’ approach will
provide a searching review of just the situation that they have
been decrying for decades, CEO domination of the compensation process, with the promise that compensation agreements
produced through managerial power will be struck down. Optimal Contracting theorists will welcome such review as well,
not only because it will strike down outlier agreements that result from illegitimate influence ex post, but because it should
improve the negotiating environment ex ante.
One important question remains: Will the Delaware courts
actually adopt this approach and engage in rigorous review of
compensation agreements? Board Capture theorists may be
skeptical, as they have in the past held out little hope that
courts are willing or able seriously to review excessive compensation. Yet, as this Article has shown, the true history of judicial review of compensation agreements is more complicated
than a simple refusal to scrutinize compensation.
Courts have in the past imposed closer scrutiny on aspects
of executive compensation and warned at other times that such
scrutiny may be applied. The Disney and Elkins decisions
should give hope that such scrutiny will again be forthcoming.
For one thing, they focus on officers, not directors. If courts
have been reluctant to place legal liability on directors because
of fears that highly qualified individuals will be unwilling to
take part-time positions and put their personal wealth at risk,
this concern should be mitigated where we are talking about
full time, highly paid employees who can avoid significant legal
exposure by making full disclosure and engaging in arm’slength negotiations with fully informed boards of directors.
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Moreover, there are persuasive arguments that officers’ direct
involvement in the management of the firm should result in
greater scrutiny of their actions than those of outside directors.338 These claims seem particularly compelling in conflict-ofinterest situations such as overreaching in the negotiation of
the officer’s own employment contract. Finally, Delaware might
want to seize an opportunity to firm up its claim that executive
compensation is a matter for state law as a way of preempting
federal action in the area. As others have pointed out in other
areas of the law, if the United States perceives that executive
compensation is out of control, and Delaware does not act, it
risks having the federal government step in and take over the
field.339 For these reasons, we are hopeful that the Delaware
courts will monitor executive employment contract negotiations
in a meaningful way. If we are right, this would not only resolve the theoretical impasse discussed here, but have a significant practical impact on executive compensation contracts.

338. Johnson & Millon, supra note 238, at 1607–08 (arguing that agency
law should be used to define corporate officers’ fiduciary duties).
339. See, e.g., Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, Symbiotic Federalism and the
Structure of Corporate Law, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1573, 1584 –88 (2005); Roe, supra note 216, at 643.

